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HUMAN RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL





A practically universal feature of violently conflicted
societies is the damage done to the Rule of Law by allowing
legislation and legal process to become another theatre of
conflict. In such societies law is manipulated to fit a State
conception of order and is thereby rendered unfit to
sufficiently restrain and legitimise that order. In terms of
transition, the goal of moving a society from violent conflict
to shared peace is rendered more complicated by law's
inability to garner, at a key defining moment, respect across
the societal divisions in need of mending. The story of many
transitions is, at one level, the story of law's attempt to
rehabilitate itself. Police (security sector)l reform tends to
have both emblematic and practical significance in this
endeavour.
This article is, in part, a case study of how issues of
legitimacy and inclusivity come to be mediated and shaped
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m.orawe@ulster.ac.uk. BA (UKC First Class), Dip Dt. Fr., LLM, Barrister-at-Law. The
author is indebted to Professor Fionnuala Ni Aol~in for her assistance with this article
and would also like to thank Professors David Bayley, Otwin Marenin, Eugene
McLaughlin, Clifford Shearing and Ruti Teitel, as well as Maggie Beirne of the CAJ, for
their comments at various stages. The author further wishes to acknowledge the research
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article.
1 On the highly disputed nature of the Security Sector Reform concept, see Michael
Brzoska (2003) Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper No. 4,
available at http://www.dcaf.chlpublications/Publications%20New/Occasional-
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through police (security sector) reform in transitional
societies. In focusing on the recourse to human rights and
diversity training for police in a post-conflict context, and
looking particularly at the recent experience of Northern
Ireland in this regard, the article aims to concretise one
element of the post-conflict construction of legitimate legal
form and tease out some of its possible paradoxes.
INTRODUCTION
In an era where State and policing are increasingly decoupled, 2
transitional societies offer a particularly rich space to work
through many fundamental questions about policing, law and the
modern State.3 However, in many ways and in many societies,
policing reform processes tend to eschew this potentially
transformational stage, hastening to fix policing with 'traditional'
tools and in 'traditional' ways. 4 Even where human rights and
community orientation are deemed to be at the forefront of the
policing reform process, the result is generally a more (or less)
reformed police structure delivered at the expense of transformed
policing and new understandings of law.
This paper starts from the premise that, in transitional
societies, policing change is, at its core, more about trying to
rehabilitate law than organisational reform per se. By moving
away from past rigidity and illegitimacy to prove itself a
2 Compare David Bayley & Clifford Shearing, The Future of Policing, 30 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 585, 585 (1996) ("Policing is now being widely offered by institutions other than the
state"), with Trevor Jones & Tim Newburn, The Transformation of Policing?
Understanding Current Trends in Policing Systems, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 129, 133-34
(2002) (acknowledging the "pluralization of policing' but finding its impact less significant
than Bayley and Shearing suggest), and Lucia Zedner, Policing Before and After the
Police: The Historical Antecedents of Contemporary Crime Control, 46 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 78, 78-79 (2006) ("suggesting an alternate reading that takes issue with the
positions represented respectively by Bayley and Shearing and by Jones and Newburn"
and "contend[ing] that contemporary trends in policing signify less a departure from
historical practice than those who proclaim the arrival of a new epoch acknowledge.").
3 See, e.g., Charles T. Call & William Stanley, Protecting the People: Public Security
Choices After Civil Wars, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 151, 152 (2001), available at
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/CallGlobalGovArticle.pdf (explaining why "the
disruption of previous state institutions and ideas associated with post-civil wars and
foreign interventions" creates special opportunities to carry out reforms and implement
new security systems).
4 See Otwin Marenin, Democracy, Democratization, Democratic Policing, CHALLENGES
OF POLICING DEMOCRACIES: A WORLD PERSPECTIVE 315 (Dilip K. Das & Otwin Marenin
eds., Gordon and Breach Publishers 2000) ("What is missing from discussions of
democracy and democratization is a theorized understanding of the police and their
relations to the state and civil society.").
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sufficiently flexible and dynamic filter for complex post-conflict
realities, law hopes, by its usefulness, to secure itself a sufficient
place in the sun from which to regulate and determine the new
order. The policing that happens in that new order will be a
partial determinant of the sustainability of the new regime and
its ability to bed down an enduring peace.
Police organisations, therefore, prove a valuable site to begin
an exploration of the extent to which law, as mediated most
frequently, in transitional spaces, through injections of human
rights and diversity training for police, can effect and affect the
rehabilitation of law and law enforcement in a post-conflict
setting. Because of the priority given to training over other
police reform initiatives internationally, and because training
represents a concrete manifestation of wider reform agendas, it is
through this lens that broader questions will be examined.
Part I of the article will begin with consideration of what it
might mean to legitimise policing in a transitional society, and
develop the first theme seen as central to this legitimisation
process-the role of law as an instrument of its own
transformation. In this regard, human rights law, with its
emphasis on minimum standards of legality, necessity,
proportionality, accountability and non-discrimination, is
interrogated for its legitimising potential when filtered into and
through a police training environment. Part I will further
consider how one jurisdiction, that of Northern Ireland, mirrors
international complexities in terms of the attempt to inject
human rights and diversity issues more fully into police training
endeavours. In this context, the paper will explore whether and
how the use of a human rights legal tool in reforming training
might actually undermine its own potential to legitimise policing.
The article will then examine, in Part II, how human rights
and diversity training interfaces with the second key strand for
police legitimisation-community endorsement. In a fractured
society, broad societal endorsement of the new policing
arrangements is obviously vital for legitimisation purposes. This
said, it would appear to be notoriously difficult for police in
transitional societies to achieve and thereafter sustain broad
acceptance within the general populace. Drawing again on the
Northern Ireland and broader international experience, this
section will begin to explore why dissonance might arise between
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the stated transitional goal of human rights compliant, inclusive
policing and what tends to happen in concrete post-conflict
settings. The section considers why and to what extent
government and police reticence may frustrate the contribution
of civil society to a much broader ownership base for law and law
enforcement.
Ultimately, the paper concludes that a State-centric framing of
law and security, coupled with a police worldview of reform,
inhibits the fostering of optimum conditions for new found
respect for law and policing in many parts of the world. For this
reason, the article questions the capacity of traditional police
models to contain and effectively harness the challenges of
human rights and pluralism in a period of transition.
The thematic lessons that emerge from this discussion go
beyond Northern Ireland or human rights training per se, to ask
deeper questions about the tools and processes currently
employed to improve and legitimate the delivery of a State
policing service. The discussion further serves to problematise
the systemic investment of communities in State policing models
in transitional societies.
NORTHERN IRELAND-A CASE STUDY IN LEGITIMACY AND
INCLUSIVITY?
Throughout, the article will develop and concretise its central
premise using recent examples of police human rights and
diversity training initiatives in Northern Ireland. This choice of
example is based on the fact that Northern Ireland is emerging
from over thirty years of sustained violent political conflict and
the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)5 has thus
consequently been the subject and object of massive change. In
this regard it has been aided by the report of an international
and independent Commission on Policing 6 (the Patten Report)
5 Formerly the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The name change took effect in
November 2001. See 'New Era' as NI Police Change Name, BBC NEWS, Nov. 4, 2001,
available at http://news.bbc.co.ukll/low/northernirelandl1636780.stm. Both acronyms
are used in the course of this article, depending on the time period being discussed.
6 See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN ENGLAND, A NEW
BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1 (1999) [hereinafter PATTEN REPORT] (this
Commission was formed following a negotiated multi-party agreement (the Good Friday
Agreement) in 1998, which was subsequently endorsed in a referendum by 71% of the
electorate in Northern Ireland); see also NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTIONS, THE 1998
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aimed at ushering in a 'new beginning' to policing in Northern
Ireland. 7 As the beneficiary of a specific blueprint explicitly
intended to focus all police action on human rights compliance,
and coming, in some measure, from a sustained and well-
resourced 8 democratic tradition, 9 the training challenges for
police reformers in Northern Ireland might be viewed as less
intractable than those presented by the experience of, for
example, South Africa,' 0 El Salvador11 or Iraq. 12
In many respects, police in Northern Ireland have faced a less
daunting reform prospect than that confronting police in other
transitional societies where social index indicators speak to much
higher levels of poverty, illiteracy and societal fragmentation. As
such, the PSNI might legitimately be expected to be at the
vanguard in terms of pushing reforms through and delivering
results. The organisation itself, as well as a number of informed
commentators,13 would certainly deem the PSNI to be at the
REFERENDUMS (2001), http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm.
7 See PATTEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 1 (speaking of "a truly historic opportunity for
a new beginning.").
8 See PATTEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 26 (noting considerable size of Northern
Ireland police service's budget).
9 However, Northern Ireland can be viewed as somewhat of a paradox within the UK,
as the Stormont regime, which governed the jurisdiction from its inception, set the
baseline for an anti-democratic framework involving high levels of discrimination against
the minority Catholic population. This legacy is being addressed in various ways within
the current peace process. For a detailed examination of the "conflicted democracy"
phenomenon, see Fionnuala Ni AolAin & Colm Campbell, The Paradox of Transition in
Conflicted Democracies, 27 HuM. RTS. Q. 172, 176 (2005).
10 See, e.g., MIKE BROGDEN & CLIFFORD SHEARING, POLICING FOR A NEW SOUTH
AFRICA 113 (Routledge Press 1993) (explaining that police reform's focus is shifting from
"police culture itself to the law that enables it to operate," and highlighting how restraint
of the police can be accomplished by "tightening the legal regime within which the police
operate so as to reduce the discretionary space available.").
11 See, e.g., Charles T. Call, Assessing El Salvador's Transition from Civil War to
Peace, in ENDING CIVIL WARS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS 383 (Stephen
John Stedman, Donald Rothchild & Elizabeth M. Cousens eds., Lynne Rienner Publishers
2002) (discussing demilitarization of society post-civil war).
12 See Robert M. Perito, WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?:
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY FORCE 318 (USIP Press Books 2004)
(stating "[u]nder Saddam Hussein, the INP had been militarized, and its doctrine,
procedures, and weapons were completely unsuited to policing in a democratic society.
Iraqis saw the INP as part of a cruel and repressive regime and described its officers as
brutal, corrupt, and untrustworthy."); see also Robert M. Perito, The Coalition Provisional
Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified, U.S. INST. OF
PEACE SPECIAL REP. 137 (2005), available at http://www.usip.org/pubsl
specialreports/sr137.html (discussing civil discord in Iraq following Saddam Hussein's
collapse and lessons that can be learned regarding police recruitment and training).
13 See, e.g., NORTHERN IRELAND POLICING BOARD, MONITORING THE COMPLIANCE OF
THE POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND WITH THE HUMANS RIGHTS ACT 1998: HUMAN
RIGHTS ANNUAL REPORT 2005, available at http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/
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cutting edge of police reform. It further provides an instructive
case study for other post-conflict societies in terms of transitional
practice in the training arena and the broader questions the
article seeks to address.
I. LEGITIMISING POLICE: TRADITIONAL THEMES AND
TRANSITIONAL DIFFICULTIES
Whether or not policing reform initially exists explicitly in
negotiated peace agreements, 14 effective policing change is, or
ultimately proves to be, organically and intimately connected to
the broader societal project of regeneration in post-conflict
societies, as demonstrated by Afghanistan,15 Iraq,16 Northern
Ireland,17 and East Timor (Timor Leste).
A goal in all post-conflict situations moving away from violent
conflict and inculcating respect for the rule of law is to create
conditions whereby policing comes to be viewed more broadly as
a public good, with local capacity sufficiently strengthened and
sufficiently accepted to take on a legitimate policing role.
Although transitional societies might differ in many important
respects, the extent to which police legitimacy can be created and
copper-fastened for the future would appear to be an important,
universal benchmark in terms of assessing the success of any
police reform project or broader peace process. Whatever the
nuances of the particular society, experience suggests that this
legitimacy will ultimately find its source in fair laws and
publicationsfhr-annreport.htm (evaluating the PSNI Human Rights Programme of
Action).
14 See Charles T. Call & William Stanley, supra note 3, at 152 (stating "If police
reforms are omitted from civil war settlements, these issues must be addressed later [as
has been the case in Mozambique, Cambodia and Nicaragua], when it will be more
difficult to find the political space and support for reorienting systems of security and
justice."); see also INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, NEGOTIATING
JUSTICE? HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE AGREEMENTS 41-47 (2006), available at
http://www.ichrp.org/paper files/128_p02_SummaryEnglish for webjpeg-covers_.pdf.
15 See, e.g., Laurel Miller & Robert Perito, Establishing the Rule of Law in
Afghanistan, U.S. INST. OF PEACE SPECIAL REP. 117 (2004), available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr117.html (summarizing international efforts to
enact police training programs in Afghanistan).
16 See, e.g., Robert M. Perito, supra note 12, at 137 (discussing how important of
police control is in gaining popular support for an international intervention).
17 See Mary O'Rawe, Transitional Policing Arrangements in Northern Ireland: The
Can't and Won't of the Change Dialectic, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1015, 1023-24 (2003)
(discussing the historical challenges Northern Ireland must overcome in order to
professionalize the police).
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community acceptance and endorsement of the policing
venture. 18
Situations vary significantly regarding practical arrangements
to achieve this end. In some countries, the legitimacy chasm is
too vast or the particular politics of conflict are too insufficiently
geared to move directly to a situation of domestic policing. In
such situations, international organisations' 9 occasionally deliver
interim policing 20 or, more often, are heavily involved in training
and supporting the development of a particular form of local
capacity in this regard. In some jurisdictions old police forces are
disbanded and new ones created.21 In others, policing reform
happens while holding onto the policing structure that existed
during the conflict. 22 In some cases, it is deemed necessary that
former combatants become part of new policing arrangements. 23
In others, they are excluded from joining.24 Some jurisdictions
have used lustration,25 prosecution or other processes to weed out
those within the police shown to have abused human rights
during the period of conflict. Others have not undertaken such
purging initiatives 26 or have invested in some form of amnesty 27
18 See Marenin, supra note 4, at 311 (stating "Democratic policing is a response to two
pressures: it represents the adaptation and incorporation of universal standards of
democratic behaviour to local policing conditions and needs.").
19 Such as the United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL), whose official website is
http://www.civpol.org.
20 Examples include Haiti and East Timor (Timor Leste). See Marie Okabe, Deputy
Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, United Nations, Daily Press Briefing by the
Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, SPOKESPERSONS' NOON BRIEFING
(Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/Newsbriefings/docs//2007/
db070221.doc.htm.
21 Examples include El Salvador and South Africa.
22 Northern Ireland maintained the police organisation during the transformation.
See O'Rawe, supra note 17, at 1020-21.
23 E.g., Phillipines, where normal police entry requirements were waived to
accommodate former combatants; also Aceh, Indonesia. see, eg., Public International Law
and Policy Group, Economic Reconstruction: Targeted Development Mechanisms (Sept.
2006), available at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/
PILPGEconomicReconstructionTargetedDevelopmentMechanisms9.8.2006.doc.
24 This is the case with Northern Ireland, though note that, while not permitted to
join the police per se, former combatants can be elected politicians and sit on the Policing
Board, in an oversight capacity. See O'Rawe, supra note 17, at 1044.
25 This occurred in some Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, and
Bulgaria, where the constitutional courts have had to struggle with issues of the past
such as lustration. See Eric Stein, Note, Briefer Notice: The Struggle for Constitutional
Justice in Post-Communist Europe, by Herman Schwartz, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 267, 268
(2001).
26 Northern Ireland has not had a drastic personnel change based on human rights
culpability during its time of transition. See O'Rawe, supra note 17, at 1015.
27 For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South Africa was given
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as an appropriate solution.
Taking into account these various factors, it is clear that, in
some places or around certain issues, reforms have been radical,
while in other places, or concerning particular matters, a
piecemeal approach has prevailed. Any and all of these
variations and processes have the capacity to be unsatisfactory in
terms of delivering legitimate, acceptable policing in a post-
conflict reality. The purpose of this section is to explore
something of why that might be.
A. The Role of Law
In many conflicted jurisdictions, the dysfunctional nature of
law28 and law enforcement has been a significant factor in the
origins and exacerbation of violence. 29 In theory, law may be
deemed to form an accepted regulatory framework for a given
society, with law enforcement agencies bolstering this premise
through their role as the repository of a monopoly of legitimate
force. 30 Conflicted societies expose this relationship as much
more complex and contested. 31
In such societies, the State is viewed by (a proportion of) the
population as illegitimate. The oppressive role generally played
by policing agents and institutions in the protection of this
contested, often authoritarian regime, 32 effectively reinforces any
initial legitimacy deficit in the conception of the State itself. In
operationalising repressive legislation and policies in a
power to provide amnesty in cases where perpetrators gave testimony as to their previous
wrongdoing during TRC hearings. See, eg., Kevin Avruch & Beatriz Vejarano, Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions: A Review Essay and Annotated Bibliography, 2 SOC. JUST.
47-108 (2001), available at http:/www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/4-2recon.pdf.
28 Although at one level the notion of law can be dismissed as little more than a
bourgeois political tool, which by its very nature tends to the protection of the elites and
powerful in any society, there is something in the principles of accountability, certainty
and equity which continues to be worth striving for and which requires, without seeking
to reify the law, some level of normative framework which seeks to regulate conduct while
respecting human dignity. It is in this sense and towards this end that the concept of the
Rule of Law is privileged and utilised throughout this article.
29 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 14, at 41-
47, 107.
30 See MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 29-30 (Max Rheinstein ed.,
Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein, trans., Harvard University Press 1954).
31 See generally RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 2000).
32 See DAVID BRUCE & RACHEL NEILD, THE POLICE THAT WE WANT: A HANDBOOK FOR
OVERSIGHT OF POLICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 15 (Alex Dodd ed., Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation 2005), available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org.
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discriminatory or arbitrary manner, police come to symbolise in a
very visible, almost palpable, way much that is wrong with law
and legal process during (and generally prior to) the period of
conflict. Highly politicised, repressive and discriminatory
policing results in out-groups in conflicted societies becoming
increasingly alienated from any positive identification with forces
of law and order. Other major organs of governance 33 also
become tainted and unable or unwilling to deliver in terms of
respect for the Rule of Law. In the fragile space created by a
cessation of hostilities, law needs to engage with these realities
in order to insert itself centre-stage at a crucial historical
juncture.
Throughout history, law time and again has proven unfit to
counter the tendencies outlined above. It appears unable to
contain or end violent conflict for three interlinked reasons: first,
how law operates in a divided society is often a salient factor in
the eruption of the initial violence. 34 Here, law is characterised
by reference to dominant elites and operates in a discriminatory
and unfair manner to create and maintain out-groups and
subclasses. Second, in failing to prevent governments' feeling
justified in using the law to excess, 35 both the potential and the
promise of the Rule of Law is further strained and distorted as a
moderating concept for State behaviour. Here law can be seen,
among other things, to provide a veneer of technical legality to
illegitimate practice. 36  Finally, the endorsement of entire
communities can be lost by the failure of law to effectively
sanction illegitimate activity when it happens. In the process,
33 Such as courts, penal institutions, and lawyers.
34 See COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN IRELAND,
DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1 (1969), available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/
hmso/cameron.htm (referring to Northern Ireland's policy of discrimination against
Catholics, which was legislated for at many levels, over several decades).
35 For a recent example, see Vikram Dodd & Carlene Bailey, Terror Law an Affront to
Justice-Judge: Control Orders Breach Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Apr. 13,
2006, at 1 (discussing human rights' erosion: "At least eleven control orders have been
issued, allowing the government to restrict the liberty and movement of people it claims
endanger public safety because of their involvement in terrorism but who can not be tried
in the courts").
36 For example, the failure of any legal regime to render unlawful United States
practice in setting up and running Guantanamo Bay as a detention centre is thereby
complicit in its illegitimacy. The United States Supreme Court has recently delivered a
limited judgment in respect of the specific issue of use of Courts Martial. See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2756 (2006) (holding "president's practicability determination
was insufficient to justify variances from the procedures governing courts-martial").
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those legal channels which do exist domestically or
internationally to regulate and render Executive action
accountable are increasingly seen by those who view a given
State's actions as illegitimate as part of a partisan, unduly
conservative, impotent or moribund dynamic which erodes faith
in legal form and substance still further as a satisfactory means
of conflict resolution. 37
An end to internal conflict generally signals an acknowledged
need to move beyond the old regime to create new political and
legal structures founded on a basis of legitimacy and
acceptability. As in the immediate past, policing institutions will
command or seek to command 38 a privileged position in the new
architecture of societal governance. As they do so, how they are
seen to impact on and be shaped by notions of legitimacy and
inclusivity has meaning beyond the institutions themselves.
B. The Legitimating Potential of Human Rights Law
Legitimising policing means many things and needs to contain
a number of elements. Exactly what is required in terms of
police reform or policing transformation may vary from society to
society, but there are a number of underpinning principles that
seem to command broad agreement-that any policing system
should be fair, impartial, reflective of the society it serves,
transparent, accountable, effective and free from partisan
political control. Many of these underpinning principles are
contained in international human rights law, and, as such, many
transitional societies look to human rights to help shape new
policing realities. The concept of Human Rights provides the
basis of a framework that has been characterised as the core of
democratic policing.39 Many commentators deem the principles of
37 See Colm Campbell, 'Wars on Terror' and Vicarious Hegemons: The UK,
International Law and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 321, 321
(2005); see also Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, To Know Where We Are Going, We
Need To Know Where We Are: Revisiting States of Emergency, in ANGELA HEGARTY &
SIOBHAN LEONARD, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 79-114
(Cavendish Publishing 1999).
38 For instance, where military supremacy has been a feature of the period of conflict,
the process may be even more fraught in terms of reinserting a "civilian" authority in any
description.
39 See PATTEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 20 (recommending "a new oath to be taken
individually by all new and existing police officers, expressing an explicit commitment to
upholding human rights.").
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legality, necessity, proportionality, accountability and non-
discrimination to be key in the creation and maintenance of
legitimate policing.40 The United Nations and others 41 have
deemed human rights sufficiently important to policing to
develop an increasingly sophisticated range of Principles,
Declarations and other soft law standards relating directly to law
enforcement activities and personnel.42
At a very real level, improved policing is about the provision on
the ground of a palpable degree of individual and community
safety, operationalised and facilitated within that accountable,
inclusive, fair and impartial human rights framework. It is
within this context that a given society needs to make further
choices as to how to make the promise of human rights real in its
concrete policing endeavours. The society must consider a range
of competing needs in this process, not least how to best ensure
effective law enforcement which offers protection to the public
during the reform period itself, possibly at a point when crime
rates are spiralling and the society is in meltdown. Similarly,
serious thought has to be given as to how to engage and facilitate
the best contribution from police and civilians who may have
huge distrust both for each other and the process of reform itself.
It is in the context of how and why and which choices are made
that the legitimating and transformative potential of human
rights can equally be undermined.
Successful police (security sector) reform will, ideally, involve a
range of disciplines4 3 and realities to take on the broader
governance challenges. Changes to other aspects of legal and
criminal justice systems will be required to secure the
imperatives of keeping communities safe within a legitimate
40 See RALPH CRAWSHAW, BARRY DEVLIN & TOM WILLIAMSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
POLICING: STANDARDS FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR AND A STRATEGY FOR CHANGE 1 (Kiuwer Law
International 1998) (arguing that the most difficult challenge facing police leaders and
managers today is the inculcation of a culture of human rights at the heart of their
organisations).
41 Others include the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
42 See UN BLUEBOOK, THE ROLE OF THE POLICE, http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/
BlueBook/BlueBooklenglish/bbecont.html.
43 See WILLIAM G. O'NEILL, INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY, POLICE REFORM IN
POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE STILL NEED TO KNOW (2005),
available at http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/PolRefERpt.pdf (discussing that the project is
not just about police and human rights experts getting together, and that input is
required from organisational and systems experts, anthropologists, psychologists,
accountants, fiscal managers, and community groups to generate holistic processes and
deliver results in terms of better policing on the ground).
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legal framework. Similarly, in organisational terms, training
reform is only one aspect of what should be a much broader
corporate and transitional strategy. This said, improved police
(and, to a lesser extent, judicial and penal service) training is
frequently seen as the key human rights contribution to police
reform. Human rights oriented police training is an obvious hook
by which law can be, and be seen to be, in some measure
rehabilitated. As such, it is often seized upon by governments,
international actors and bilateral donors as an obvious thing to
be done.
The tendency to invest training with huge practical and
symbolic value in terms of its ability to usher in change 44 is
evident internationally from an examination of various countries.
For example, the experience of Afghanistan resonates with that
of other jurisdictions in that: "[t]hough Afghan and international
officials often refer to rule of law development as a high priority,
the necessary measures are not being treated with urgency,
except for police training."45
In transitional societies, expectations around training take on
a heightened significance and urgency around issues of human
rights and diversity, because these have historically been sites
where legitimate State practice has been lacking, and where the
Rule of Law has most obviously been manipulated to meet State
ends. However, the significance accorded to police human rights
and diversity training in terms of the rehabilitation of law may
be misplaced, particularly in terms of the broader peace-building
endeavour.
Clear costs are associated with investing too much store in the
power of training to inculcate human rights compliance in
policing-not least because this visible device may fail to deliver
visible results, while in the process cementing or perpetuating
not-so-visible realities and understandings of policing, conflict
and the past which can stand in the way of progress. At some
level, this is tied up with "the symbolic ... dominance of the
police ... [as] an emblematic expression of state authority and
44 See PATTEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.1 (stating "training, education and
development of police officers and civilian staff will be critical to the success of this
transformation.").
45 See Miller and Perito, supra note 15, at 1.
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important justification for the very being of the modern state."46
For all the stated commitment to improved policing and human
rights from governments and even international agencies, there
are often unstated assumptions about the absolute need for
strong state police forces.
However, as Skolnick has argued, police, better than any other
institution, typify the tension between law and order. 47 This is
particularly the case where the State itself lacks legitimacy and
its conception of order is at variance with the needs,
understandings and expectations of a diverse group of people
being policed. 48 In conflicted spaces it is clear that police pull
towards State notions of order and conformity at the expense of
proportionality and legitimacy.49 If then, in conflicted societies,
the notion of the legitimacy of the State itself is contested, it is
surely somewhat ironic that the symbolic and practical changes
to policing during a period of transition might actually end up
cementing a conception of State and law that is, of itself,
inherently problematic.
A key question in transitional societies must be, having
experienced at first hand the tendency of policing to become
decoupled from effective legal restraint: 50 Can such organisations
be successfully rehabilitated and brought to value principles of
legality, necessity, proportionality, accountability and non-
discrimination more completely? Can a "neutral" police
organisation be created, and to what extent is that actually what
46 Zedner, supra note 2, at 82.
47 See JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 6 (Macmillan Publishing 1994) (1966).
48 For example, in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (renamed Police
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in November 2001) was originally formed in the early
1920s to police the 6 northeastern counties of a partitioned Ireland. Historically, despite
initial plans to have a proportion of Catholics within its ranks, the force has largely
drawn its members from the Protestant community in Northern Ireland. This is linked in
large part to its role as defender of a contested State that for many decades operated a
governmental system that was overtly discriminatory against Catholics.
49 Much evidence exists of RUC involvement, in partisan policing and human rights
abuses, particularly directed against the Catholic/Nationalist community in Northern
Ireland. See, e.g., PATRICK FINUCANE, CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT (2004), available
at http://cain.ulst.ac.uklissues/ collusion/cory/cory03finucane.pdf (highlighting evidence of
collusion between the security forces and paramilitary organisations and recommending
public inquiries into 4 particular murders); POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT (2007), http://www.policeombudsman.org//Publicationsuploads/
BALLAST%20PUBLIC%20STATEMENT%2022-01-07%20FINAL%20VERSION.pdf
(discussing circumstances surrounding Raymond McCord, Jr.'s murder, and finding high
level collusion by the security apparatus in at least ten civilian murders).
50 See SKOLNICK, supra note 47, at 12.
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is required? Also, if reforms are not seen to deliver in public
safety terms, will that cause disillusionment in the minds of the
public and decrease any legitimacy the new dispensation might
have initially inspired?
It is against this backdrop that assumptions and assertions
made in many parts of the world about the power of training to
effect real policing change need to be carefully questioned. The
usefulness of human rights and diversity training as a
legitimating strategy in transitional contexts is clearly
predicated on what it is sought to legitimate and why. For
example, a flurry of training-related activity ostensibly aimed at
delivering effective, human rights compliant policing5l can form
an important strand in the construction of a disingenuous or
misguided discourse around the extent to which police
transformation has happened or is under way. Within this
narrative, the appearance of extensive change in training is
posited as an unqualified good. However, this might serve a
multiplicity of organisational and government agendas, which do
not necessarily have anything to do with enhanced respect for
human rights or the delivery of effective, respectful policing on
the ground. The reality is that, for all the effort put into human
rights training, unhelpful police attitudes, value structures and
behaviour may actually change very little.52
Whatever the rhetoric, neither glossy training manuals filled
with human rights language, nor the fact of international or local
involvement in the change process is sufficient in itself to ensure
the legitimacy of policing. Recent strategies aimed at inserting
human rights into the heart of police structures may leave police
officers speaking the language of human rights, but without fully
appreciating the usefulness of the tool or its expectations in
relation to the whole range of policing activities. 53 Similarly, if
51 In many places, this is accompanied and bolstered by international input, whether
from the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or through the intervention of foreign state police
personnel (via the UN International Civilian Police (CIVPOL) or otherwise) and entities
such as the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. State Department
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP).
52 See Marenin, supra note 4, at 318 ("[Human rights] abuses occur for many reasons,
not forgetfulness or neglect or insufficient training. Reform requires an understanding of
the occupational norms of the job and its political nature and relations to society and the
state. Merely changing the technical skills of the police ... will not work").
53 For example, video recording equipment was recently introduced in parts of China
in an effort to provide safeguards against torture and ill treatment of detainees during
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officers receive training, but are still unable to protect the public,
the tendency might be to dismiss the utility of human rights as
an effective, underpinning policing strategy.
All too often international experience indicates that where
human right training is delivered to police:
[T]here is no overall training concept, just a series of courses
offered to meet short-term political or security objectives...
there is often no serious attempt to modify course materials
and course methodology to ensure that local culture is
respected and adopted [and] in most cases there is no
coordinated plan to ensure [appropriate and relevant]
cooperation in the development and delivery of training.54
This lack of a sufficiently holistic and coordinated approach is
evident at a number of levels and in a whole range of contexts.
In part, it speaks to a desire of those in power to hold onto
particular organisational models, structures and frameworks
that cement particular power bases within society. This need to
fill power vacuums is felt particularly keenly by those seeking
control in transitional societies. However, outside of short-term
political agendas, the organisational structure is only as
important as its ability to give effect to legitimate legal principles
and to withstand the pull toward protection of hegemonies and
arbitrary and unfair treatment of minorities. It should not
therefore be the organisation that is the focus of reform, but the
concept of policing itself.
A reform agenda based on or largely dependent upon improved
training cannot begin to deal with this reality. Human rights
training at this point is likely to be de-contextualised, narrowly
conceived, or otherwise inappropriate to wider societal needs. A
transitional police force may still be in deep denial about its own
past wrongdoing. A newly created police force may be in denial
about its own potential for future wrongdoing. A police
contingent, whether international or local, may be very poorly
equipped to assess what is needed and ultimately ensure its
interrogation. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that, ostensibly on financial grounds, a
number of police have only been turning the equipment on to record the confession rather
than to monitor the circumstances in which it was obtained.
54 CHALLENGES PROJECT, MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS:
COOPERATION AND COORDINATION 132 (Elanders Gotab 2005),
http://www.challengesproject.net/roach/images/pdf/phaseII_concluding-report.pdf.
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delivery. At the same time, the same contingent may have a
vested interest in being seen to deliver. Poorly conceived or
inappropriately delivered human rights training at this stage is
thus understandable, but also has the potential to impact
negatively on the complex dynamics which operate around
moving police from a problematic past to a more legitimate
future. At a time when human rights values need to be firmly
and fully embedded, inappropriate or insufficient human rights
and diversity training might serve to engender complacency,
cynicism or some other form of unhelpful backlash. Experience
has shown that precisely at the time when it is easiest to make
mistakes, there is almost no room for error. "[E]specially in the
early days of police reform ... getting off to a good start is vital,
and generating early tangible results is crucial as well."55
This said, results should not be seen in terms of boxes to be
ticked, and will only be truly valid if arrived at and measured by
holistic strategies and inclusive processes. The Northern Ireland
experience, as well as other international experiences, is
indicative of the potential within civil society to provide meaning
and significance to police reform strategies not being fully
realised. If sufficiently harnessed, such endorsement could and
should affect paradigm shifts in terms of what policing is and
could be.56
International experience instead evidences a tendency for
training and other policing reform ventures not to sufficiently
countenance what is needed to create conditions for truly
legitimate, representative and inclusive policing to come about.
Instead, police reformers in many contexts may impose a fairly
linear police worldview, 57 which values the imposition of a
narrow conception of order in the process at the expense of the
legitimating effect of a high degree of inclusiveness. As Marenin
55 See O'NEILL, supra note 43, at 5.
56 See Call & Stanley, supra note 3, at 152 (stating "international actors need to
engage in ambitious agenda setting during peace negotiations to help the parties to
conflicts envision new ways of policing rooted in unrestricted human rights, ethnic
tolerance, and citizen service and [that these imperatives go beyond the immediate
concerns of peace making as traditionally understood.]").
57 See Marenin, supra note 4, at 317 ("The police will not stand idly by while their
professional norms, political power and organisational priorities are challenged. They will
seek to shape their job, mandate, policies, programmes, image and ideologies to suit their
own conceptions of what is the problem they are asked to deal with and what needs to be
done.").
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points out:
The inertia of police culture, especially if the police
organisation must retain members who worked as police
during discredited regimes ... (such as in Estonia,
Hungary or Russia), tends toward the promotion of order
rather than rights and freedoms. This professional outlook
imbues all police forces anywhere. But in transitional
societies, in which demands for rights and freedom (which
the police denied citizens under previous regimes) were
precisely the reasons for agitation to overthrow the
existing regime, this professional tendency is much more
visible, controversial and harder to overcome. 58
Similarly, the difficulties of engaging with or capacity building
within a traumatised and potentially hostile or divided public
should not be under-estimated. It begins then to be clear why
police forces in transitional societies end up on a reform
continuum rather than a transformative trajectory. In concrete
terms, and across police agencies, organisational human rights
compliance is notoriously difficult to embed. Given all the
obstacles that can stand in the way of effective understanding
and learning in this area, it is spurious to suggest that police can
effectively be "trained" in human rights and diversity-this for a
number of reasons.
Human Rights and Diversity training might be resisted as
being imposed from the outside and having a subtext which takes
insufficient account of police expertise and know-how. This kind
of law might be viewed as little more than a "criminal's
charter"-insufficiently concerned either for victims or police
officers themselves. It might equally be viewed as another level
of bureaucracy or discretion fettering which will get in the way of
effective policing.
The "message" and impact of human rights is also likely to be
skewed and distorted by standard police organisational processes
and baggage. 59 Human rights training can lose traction
58 Marenin, supra note 4, at 324.
59 For example, in Northern Ireland, one police trainer commented, "Police have had
training for the Human Rights Act yet it didn't begin to train them in human rights. The
organisation has assumed the training in this area was done. It wasn't. It reinforced the
idea that human rights are a criminal's charter." MARY O'RAWE & JIM MCMANUS, N. IR.
HUMAN RTS. COMM'N, HuMAN RIGHTS IN POLICE TRAINING-REPORT FOUR: COURSE FOR
ALL 51 (2004), available at http://www.nihrc.org/dms/data/NIHRC/attachments/dd/files/
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particularly where there is any mismatch with officers' own
experience of being treated with respect by their colleagues, their
trainers and/or senior management. Any organisational
contradictions and contra-indications as to the level of priority to
be given to human rights will be seized upon to denigrate human
rights as a useful strategy to be implemented. To allow the
challenges of human rights to filter into the conscious and
subconscious life of the organisation concerned, paradigm shifts
are needed. Unless the organisation develops mechanisms to
effectively human rights-proof existent or new policies and
procedures, what is proffered as policy in a training environment
may be undermined by other messages being given out by the
organisation. The human rights-proofing of policies and
procedures in respect of recruitment, transfer, promotion,
operations, discipline, and grievance are particularly important
in this regard. If the organisation is seen to be treating its own
members unfairly, huge cynicism will attach to the "corporate
message" of human rights.
The lack of a holistic approach can be compounded in the
choice of trainers. Where external actors are used to deliver bits
of training, the defensiveness engendered by outside intervention
can raise specific problems. This can be the case particularly if
such input is not attuned to contextual and cultural as well as
organisational sensitivities as to how it might be received. For
example, depending on the context, human rights training might
be seen as part of a political agenda to unfairly criticise serving
officers for poor past human rights practice. In other situations,
the imposition of "Western" or "Northern" models and concepts 60
might be perceived at some level as a new form of colonialism. 61
75/HRPolice4_Report.pdf.
60 See Jeffrey Lever & Elrena van der Spuy, Challenges Facing Democratic Policing in
South Africa, in CHALLENGES FOR POLICING DEMOCRACIES, supra note 4, at 208 ("Donor
assistance to the SAPS [South African Police Service] has contributed to an increasing
shift, particularly at the rhetorical level, of local policing ideas toward the internationally
dominant Western norm .... However it cannot be assumed that the process of
internationalization is a simple or internally consistent transfer of good things. Theories
and practices imported from abroad may not prove effective when put to the test under
vastly different policing conditions.").
61 See generally Arianit Koci, Legitimation and Culturalism: Towards Policing
Changes In The European 'Post-Socialist' Countries, in POLICING AND CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE: COMPARING FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE WITH EXPERIENCE FROM THE
WEST (College of Police and Security Studies 1996), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/policing/leg219.htm (noting social and political transformations
happening in central and eastern Europe).
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The use of internal police trainers can pose its own problems,
some of which will be explored more fully below.
A human rights compliant service cannot be created in
traditional ways, or delivered by training which revolves around
the provision of particular time limited interventions, largely
divorced from other aspects of organisational structure and
processes. Even where there is a degree of interconnectedness at
a strategic management level, there are still huge question
marks as to the extent to which the traditional police model has
the capacity to contain and bring to fruition human rights
compliance within a command control, hierarchical, essentially
male and bureaucratic framework. Some of these issues will be
canvassed further in Part II.
What is required in any given society at a particular time
should ideally be gleaned from a broadly drawn needs analysis-
an outline of the problem in order to craft the appropriate
solution for a given jurisdiction at a given time. Such a needs
analysis rarely, if ever, happens in transitional spaces. 62 If it did,
it would need to make space for a broad range of questions and
concerns. Some of these would be germane to particular forms
and experiences of conflict; some would deal with how law has
been shaped and manipulated in the process. Still others would
deal with forms and models of policing per se, which have failed
(and not just in conflicted societies), 63 but which are tenaciously
clung to as the "given" in the change equation. 64
62 This phenomenon frequently thwarts international efforts. All too often,
international police are dispatched to conflict zones where "an adequate assessment of the
needs of the society in question has not been conducted .... These assessments should
not only include what is needed from UNPOL, but should also include a background
analysis of the conflict itself, the potential for reoccurring conflict, and what factors may
influence an international policing mission .... Such assessments could be greatly
improved if they were conducted by teams having a broad range of expertise-and not
only in policing or security-particularly incorporating the expertise of regional
organisations and NGOs." See EIRIN MOBEKK, GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC
CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES, IDENTIFYING LESSONS IN UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL
POLICING MISSIONS 14 (2005), available at http://www.dcaf.chl_docs/ppO9_united-nations-
international_policing.pdf.
63 "No police agency is meeting in full its duty actively to protect human rights." See
CRAWSHAW ET AL., supra note 40, at 2. Police organisations across the world also fail to
measure up in a range of other important respects, not least, universally low rates of
crime detection.
64 As Otwin Marenin suggests: "It is as if state power and control were a natural, self-
generated occurrence and not something done and achieved by personnel employed to
create social order, control deviance and crime, and ensure the continuity of the state."
See Marenin, supra note 4, at 314.
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One key area for societal discussion is the extent to which
policing reform initiatives need to interface with the legacy of
conflict. The potential of human rights training to de-legitimate
rather than legitimate the transformative message of human
rights law where it does not engage effectively with past police
wrongdoing will now be explored.
C. The Legacy of the Past: The Significance of Historical and
Legal Accuracy
Part of the rehabilitation of law lies in the ability of law
enforcement agencies to face up to and grapple with what has
been wrong with law (and by extension law enforcement) in the
past. The significance of historical and legal accuracy and the
shaping of the official conflict narrative to conform with or at
least allow the experiences of those at the rough end of policing
are undoubtedly necessary. The extent to which it is necessary
might vary from society to society and be more or less
appropriate at particular junctures. This subsection considers
whether there are some generic principles that can be drawn
from international law and married with the experience of
policing reform processes to date in order to create some
optimum indicators for successful policing transformation in
terms of its engagement with the past.
Truth recovery, public acknowledgement of wrongdoing by all
actors in the conflict and the extent to which a country needs to
create a shared history are vexed and multi-dimensional issues
necessitating degrees of frankness, mediation, and generosity of
spirit that do not come easily in fractured societies. Many
societies are split by opposing views on the degree to which truth
needs to be told, when that needs to happen, and the extent to
which a line should be drawn under the past to give a peace
process the necessary degree of momentum to bypass flashpoints
for return to violence. Even where there is consensus on the
need to learn from history in order not to repeat it, the most
appropriate vehicles to take this forward are equally hotly
contested. In time, most societies come to an acceptance of the
need to recognise what in the past might, if unaddressed or
unsatisfactorily addressed, return to haunt the present or disturb
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the future. 65 This might happen in informal ways, but there are
clearly potential benefits to be gained by law in mediating the
process more formally and ensuring that a broad range of voices
come to be heard. Aogan Mulcahy argues, "[p]oints of crisis [in a
peace process] are often categorised precisely by the emergence of
these hidden transcripts onto the public stage. Focusing on these
hidden histories may shed greater light on the dynamics of
police-community relations by offering an oppositional reading of
events that privileges the experience of the subordinate over the
rhetoric of the dominant, and that questions the 'consensual
basis' of authority in liberal-democratic societies."66
The State should facilitate the hearing of these histories
through law in order for its own claim to be heard loudly that it
disavows practices that were corrosive and corrupting of the Rule
of Law in the past. This would appear to be a necessary means of
ensuring that that same Rule of Law is inserted as an accepted
good centre stage in the peace process.
In Northern Ireland, an international commission on policing
(The Patten Commission)67 put forward what has been hailed
internationally as an important blueprint for policing change.
The Commission's solutions were highly contested precisely
because the Commissioners had not outlined sufficiently what it
was in current and past policing arrangements that necessitated
change. As Mulcahy argues:
[T]he failure to examine the past-or even explain the
differing interpretations of same-may, in large part
have been at the root of continued institutional
resistance within government and the police [to the
reforms proposed by Patten]. With no justifications
offered for the need for radical change, it is hardly
65 An international Symposium on Challenges of Policing Democracies held in Onati
in 1995 concluded: "[I]t can be shown that even countries born out of revolutions
motivated by the desire to return political power to the people experienced discrepancies
between what was promised by leaders and what actually occurred. Those responsible for
overthrowing dictators often used their newly acquired power to attempt to control the
police and courts in manners very similar to those used by the former regimes." Peter C.
Kratcoski, Policing in Democratic Societies, CHALLENGES OF POLICING DEMOCRACIES,
supra note 4, at 39.
66 AOGAN MULCAHY, POLICING NORTHERN IRELAND: CONFLICT, LEGITIMACY AND
REFORM 19 (William Publishing 2006).
67 The Patten Report made 175 recommendations to change the nature and structure
of policing in Northern Ireland and link it more comprehensively to human rights
protection. See PATTEN REPORT, supra note 6, 107-22.
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surprising that many wondered why it was at all
necessary... Past controversies would, however, remain
perhaps the dominant feature in public debate about the
report's implementation. 68
The process by which some of the Patten recommendations
have been implemented and others have not; the reason why
some recommendations have been incorporated into legislation
while others have not has been left largely in police and civil
service hands. The privileging of particular framings of the past
has influenced all decisions made. Why policing is still such a
fraught and sensitive political issue in Northern Ireland 69 also
relates to choices made by government to try to institute change
to a force whose past it still praises with these choices
contributing to dragging out the transitional reform process for
much longer than necessary.
In other transitional societies, particularly where there is no
regime change, or where a society remains locked in a state of
"meta-conflict"70 around what the conflict was about, a full
definition of the extent of state liability for past wrong-doing can
prove elusive. This calling to account for past abuse may,
however, be a vital ingredient to foster trust in the peace and
police reform process among previously marginalised and
alienated communities. How this is done and the extent to which
it must be done has proved highly problematic in practice with
different jurisdictions embracing or rejecting a variety of truth
recovery processes and mechanisms. 71
Even where Truth Commissions and other truth recovery
processes take place, often what is not rendered visible by such
mechanisms is frequently as important as what is. It can be the
68 MULCAHY, supra note 66, at 166.
69 The High Council of the Sinn Fdin (the majority nationalist party in Northern
Ireland) passed a motion on January 28, 2007 (eight years after the Patten Report), to
finally begin to cooperate with new policing arrangements, and consider taking up party
seats on the civilian Policing Board, not because transformation had been achieved, but
"to put manners on them" and "dismantle them from the inside brick by brick." See Sinn
Fdin Votes to Support Police, BBC NEWS, Jan. 28, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northernireland16308175.stm; see Tom Kelly, Maybe Someone
Needs to Put Manners on Sinn Fjin, IRISH NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/irish-news/arts2007/feb5_mannersSFTKelly.php.
70 See CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (Oxford
University Press 2000) (1967) (defining "meta-conflict" as "conflict about what the conflict
is about").
71 See generally Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and
Atrocity (NewYork Routledge 2001).
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case that less formal processes bring information or experiences
to light that official mechanisms are either unwilling to
countenance or unable to assimilate satisfactorily into official
versions of the truth about the conflict. Where this happens, the
simple act of public and official acknowledgement of truths which
have become part of the folklore of any given society may be
precisely what is needed to allow the marginalised in that society
to have faith that the reform process itself is to be trusted.
The United Nations' updated set of Principles on Impunity72 is
clear that victims have a right to know what happened to their
loved ones. As Christine Bell has argued, accountability is
necessary "to provide new political arrangements with
legitimacy," to combat revisionism and to foster conditions for
reconciliation.7 3 Dealing with the past is particularly crucial
when it comes to institutional reforms aimed at establishing the
rule of law. If the legacy of conflict is not sufficiently factored
into mechanisms and processes aimed at ushering in a new, more
legitimate era, this has implications for the stability, durability
and ultimate effectiveness of any nascent peace process either
where Truth Commissions have happened or in places like
Mozambique, Cambodia and Northern Ireland, where they have
not.74
I would argue that, whatever the macro-level machinations
around how and when and to what extent to recover truth, if past
abuse by the State is ignored or goes unsaid in the police training
arena, a vital legitimating tool is lost to the training programme
and the broader change process. If, on the micro level, police
training in human rights fails to acknowledge and engage with
the de facto phenomenon of both the occurrence of (and
continuing impunity for) human rights violations committed by
police officers linked to a repressive regime during the conflict, it
is difficult to see how such training can simultaneously be
effective in ushering in human rights compliant, acceptable
policing and the corollary of respect for the Rule of Law on the
72 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
[2005] 5-19, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005), available at http://www.flghrwg.net/
reports/UN2005/impunity.pdf.
73 See Bell, supra note 70, at 271.
74 This is not to say that truth recovery processes have not taken place at different
levels and to a greater or lesser extent within these societies in the absence of a formal
expansive truth commission.
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ground.
D. Where does this sit with the delivery of human rights and
diversity training to police?
Essentially, police training can, within current models, take
place without an effective needs analysis geared toward systemic
and societal needs. It can equally take place in the absence of
shared consensus about past conflict. Instead, narrowly
perceived organisational imperatives can classically assume that
transformation is possible without having to address, in some
shape or form, the past legacy of policing during the period of
conflict.
Consideration of human rights and issues of diversity tend not
to fare particularly well within this framework. This does not
mean that they are not being addressed. On the contrary,
training documents and policies may overflow with references to
such issues. However, problems arise where human rights and
diversity issues are being mediated though the lens of a police
worldview de-contextualised on a surface level from the legacies
of conflict.
It is clearly understandable that a police organisation (such as
the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland) that has
come through the experience of violent conflict might be at pains
to reassure itself that it performed well in the past, even in the
face of enormous evidence that, in human rights terms, it was
sadly lacking. 75 There is a profound need to articulate that
"We're all professionals in the room," "Policing in the past was
Al," "We've been doing all this anyway," and "Human rights is
just about putting different words to our practice." 76 This
message is more likely to be reinforced where members of the
same force deliver training, and will themselves wish to identify
both with their colleagues, as well as former positive policing
behaviour. This is why those chosen to design and deliver
human rights and diversity training is so significant.
75 See supra text accompanying note 49. This has also been documented in several of
Amnesty International's Annual Reports, up to and including its 2005 report. All reports
available for purchase at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/index.html.
76 Comments made by Northern Ireland police trainers to their colleagues during
author's observation for the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission of a 2003 PSNI
course on the new Northern Ireland policing context (the "Course for All").
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While delivering the human rights message through internal
trainers might be more comfortable for the organisation, and can
be argued for in terms of the possibility of internal "on message"
personnel acting as valuable change agents, it devalues the
human rights message to have it delivered in this way. Where
trainers themselves have insufficient knowledge or
understanding of the human rights challenges for policing, they
can end up shoring up unhelpful police mindsets with regard to
human rights. Furthermore, in celebrating or repackaging a
non-human rights compliant past, this approach dilutes the
power of international human rights standards, particularly
those against impunity for past wrongdoing.
If the training is given by agents not well versed in human
rights and diversity issues, the results can be problematic. For
example, in RUC/PSNI training events, course materials have
been found to be dated and highly selective in terms of human
rights case law from the European Court of Human Rights. Key
judgments, if referred to at all in the delivery of courses, were at
times given a police/government "spin" or inaccurately conveyed.
For example, in 2003, one trainer referring to the seminal case of
Ireland v. United Kingdom,77 in which the Commission found
that torture had occurred and the Court concluded that the five
"deep interrogation" techniques used in Northern Ireland in the
1970s amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,
presented it thus:
In this case, the European Court of Human Rights
said that we have never tortured our prisoners. They
did suggest in their thousands of pages of summing up
that some of our interview techniques maybe bordered
on degrading treatment, hooding, sleep deprivation
and all that stuff ... these were never charged, never
proved but the torture one was disproved in court. 78
Not only is this information inaccurate on many levels, it
serves to feed the dynamic that there was nothing fundamentally
wrong with policing in the past.79 This is precisely the dynamic
77 See 2 E.H.R.R. 25 (1980) (holding United Kingdom's treatment of suspects was an
"infringement of Art. 3 as a form of inhuman or degrading treatment").
78 O'RAWE & MCMANUS, supra note 59, at 49.
79 See O'RAWE & MCMANUS, supra note 59, at 31. In the words of one trainer: "The
RUC was the most efficient and effective counter-terrorist force in the world. Everything
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that needs to change to usher in a new era, and a new culture in
regard to the transition of policing and beyond. Countering
skewed views of the past is something that requires a deep
learning programme and- skilled facilitation-often something
that is lacking where police officers design and/or deliver human
rights programmes.
The tendency to valorize and continue old patterns of
behaviour is singularly inappropriate to the new context which
policing must have a hand in shaping. This is perhaps most
starkly borne out by findings of the Northern Ireland Human
Rights Commission in respect of the use of force training
provided to new PSNI recruits. Given the clear historical
resonance around past experience of brutal policing and the
decided lack of accountability of state agents, it would be vitally
important in the context of any transitional society to confront
these issues head on to ensure that bad practices are recognized
and drawn back from.
However, PSNI training in the use of force highlights the
difficulties of shaking old mindsets in the supposed move from
paramilitary force to community service. In 2002, considering
training given to the first batch of new recruits taken on after
Patten, the NIHRC was concerned at the amount of time spent
on demonstrating ways in which extreme forms of violence can be
effective in dealing with an attack.
Trainer: In different situations you have to be quick
and fast. . Don't forget the groin stuff: squeeze, pull,
tug as hard as you can; you may even end up with a
good handful of DNA, which will help you to catch the
person.
Trainer: I might decide that I'm going to smash his
kneecap off. A flat-handed strike to the patella can
remove it.s0
While aware that there are "circumstances where police
officers could be perfectly entitled to use every physical means at
was Al. People came from all over the world to see how we did it."
80 MARK KELLY, N. IR. HUMAN RTS. COMM'N, AN EVALUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TRAINING FOR STUDENT POLICE OFFICERS IN THE POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND
30-31 (2002) [hereinafter NIHRC 2002 REPORT], available at http://www.nihrc.org/
index.php?page=res.details&category-id=30&Itemid=l.
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their disposal in order to prevent severe injury to themselves or
others,"81 Mark Kelly, the author of the NIHRC report, was left
with the distinct impression that he had been witness to "fight
training.., as opposed to training in control and restraint
techniques which might cause pain. but are less likely to result in
injury."82 He concluded, "[m]ore generally, it should be possible to
teach professional police officers to deploy anti-violence
techniques which are far more sophisticated than grabbing
testicles, smashing kneecaps and poking eyes."8 3
These further statements by trainers in 2002 serve to illustrate
that, far from retreating from such techniques, aggressive
behaviour was arguably being facilitated and compounded by
student officers being trained in the art of saying the "right"
thing rather than doing the right thing. They further indicate a
lack of appreciation as to how macho and unhelpful behaviour by
police officers can, over the course of even one short incident,
operate to destroy a community's fledgling faith in the reformed
policing arrangements.
Trainer: Nowhere in the written legislation will you
find a requirement to use the minimum force, so don't
say that you used minimum force.
Trainer: If you are challenged on your use of force,
remember to always use the phrase 'it was my
perception and honestly-held belief.'
Student: (during a session on ground defence
techniques): Can you give him [the assailant] a kick on
the way out?
Trainer: That's up to you. It depends on your 'honestly
held belief and perception.' What you wouldn't want is
for it to be seen on video that you'd gone and kicked
him after bringing him down.84
More than a year later, and despite the concerns iterated by
the NIHRC report, very similar statements were still being made
81 NIHRC 2002 REPORT, supra note 80, at 31.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 30.
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to probationer PSNI constables:
Trainer: If you hit a person fairly softly four or five
times, that can create four or five bruises. So from our
point of view, when they go to a doctor or solicitor
there will be more medical evidence that can be used
against us. So, it's far better, if you do use physical
force against someone, to hit them [sic] as hard as you
possibly can. Because, if you think about it, has any
machine been invented which can be wheeled into
Court and used to prove your actual force, and
whether you used all of it, or only 50%?85
NIHRC's 2004 report further picked up on the presence of
certain written notices in some training venues: "You fought the
good fight-now write it right" and "To win the real fight we need
to adopt an offensive mind-set."86 These sentiments run
completely counter to the type of ethos that needs to be injected
by training to effect a transformation in policing practice on the
streets. Instead, they speak to a deeper police subculture
persisting even in light of clear training improvements and
massive changes throughout the organisation.
NIHRC's 2004 report further demonstrates that, on top of this,
probationers of "questionable proficiency" were being deemed to
have satisfactorily completed their course of training when they
were clearly not ready to police the public. The report provides
an example of one probation officer who was seen on at least two
successive occasions misapplying handcuffs to a colleague,
causing that colleague "considerable pain." Although trainers
attempted to intervene, they were unable to correct the actions of
the person concerned. This same person was later recorded on
video,
striking a completely unjustified blow with a (practice)
baton to a role player... who was not to be regarded
as a potential assailant. Although this shortcoming
was highlighted by a trainer in the subsequent
debriefing session, no formal assessment was made of
85 MARK KELLY, N. IR. HUMAN RTS. COMM'N, HuMAN RIGHTS IN POLICE TRAINING -
REPORT THREE: PROBATIONER CONSTABLES AND STUDENT OFFICERS 24 (2004) [hereinafter
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the performance of any of the probationers who
participated in the course. On the following day, all of
the probationers observed were issued with real
batons and, one working day later, they took up their
functions in District Command Units throughout
Northern Ireland.87
While some of NIHRC's 2002 recommendations were taken on
board by the PSNI, the inevitable conclusion of the 2004 report
was that the PSNI had still not adopted a holistic approach to
human rights training delivery.
NIHRC defined the situation in terms of the PSNI
"continu[ing] to deny itself the means to ensure that learning
events reach, and maintain, a uniformly high standard."88 The
broader question might be whether police can be sufficiently
opened up to the very different realities and imperatives
mandated by ideals of human rights and diversity. If it is so
difficult to manipulate human rights concepts to make them fit
naturally within the strictures of traditional police training and
organisational models, perhaps the question should be whether
the organisations must materially change to provide a better fit
for human rights.
At the other end of the spectrum, nascent and emergent
governments and police organisations may not deal effectively
with the past for other reasons. They may not yet feel ready to
flex muscles too quickly in terms of categorically denouncing the
past, particularly where the erstwhile power maintains a
continuing presence.8 9 Equally, the police mindset might be
focused more tactically than strategically, and there may not
seem that there is much to be gained by looking backwards.
With "all new" forces, a different, but no less problematic,
dynamic operates where training fails to engage with the past.
In considering themselves to be more reflective of society or
morally superior to their predecessors in other ways, new police
forces may feel there is no danger that they, in their turn, will
commit human rights abuses. This might seem reason enough
87 Id. at 26.
88 Id. at 41.
89 For example, consider the experience in post-Pinochet Chile, where laws giving
blanket amnesty to state actors were allowed to remain on the statute books for a
considerable period of time.
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not to worry too deeply about past wrongdoing by other police.
However, the ability of unhelpful police organisational cultures
and subcultures to re-form and re-group, even in "new" bodies,
means that "all new" bodies may be equally at risk of drawing
and repeating in some measure inappropriate lessons from the
past.90 Heaping opprobrium totally onto the shoulders of past
policing can, therefore, serve to divert from what needs to be
firmly challenged in the development of the new.
There is obviously a degree of self-protection and political
sagacity in all of these "unwillingnesses" to interrogate the "hard
stuff' about the past. To poke and prod and worry at it,
particularly in early retraining initiatives, might seem suicidal in
policing terms, especially given the need for some degree of police
functioning to be ongoing while new training and other reforms
settle in. However, it is often a short-term political agenda that
eschews creating safe spaces in the training arena to really
grapple and come to terms with what was wrong with the past.
In being geared simply to build for the future, de-contextualised
human rights training may, wittingly or otherwise, cement an
untenable or partial view of the past while seeming to allow that
impunity for past abuse can be countenanced in human rights
terms. This myopic approach may have an initial appeal, but is
ultimately likely to jeopardise the legitimising project in the
longer term.
The continuing lack of sufficient human rights awareness
among police trainers and the failure to involve trainers from
outside the police in any comprehensive way can compound a
tendency to emphasise "the lawful authority for police action to
the detriment of fully considering its human rights
implications."91 This emphasis on legal powers rather than
human rights is generally one of the main deficiencies in policing
during periods of conflict. In Northern Ireland, the NIHRC
commented that to continue with such an approach post-conflict
"could have pernicious consequences in a jurisdiction such as
Northern Ireland, where very broad legal powers have been
granted to the police."92 This point is well made. Indeed, one
might go further and suggest that there is something important
90 Such was the experience of El Salvador in this regard.
91 NIHRC 2004 REPORT, supra note 85, at 19.
92 Id. at 17.
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to be unpicked in the continuing failure to realign training more
fully toward human rights processes and outcomes.
E. The Northern Ireland Training Experience - A Case Study in
Legitimacy?
In terms of Northern Ireland, the legitimating potential of
human rights was recognised. Patten placed Human Rights
squarely in the centre of policing reform. The Patten blueprint
for change in policing ranged much wider than just training.
However, in the midst of 175 recommendations, thirty-five
related directly to training, education and development, while
many other recommendations had training implications of one
sort or another. The bulk of these focused specifically on the
need to integrate a human rights dimension into every aspect of
the training process.93 Thus, it is useful to look at how the Patten
implementation process has played out in respect of training in
terms of engaging the transformation of law and the inclusion of
disaffected communities.
The emphasis on human rights marks a very clear break from
a security-focused model and the RUC/PSNI clearly attempted to
incorporate this framework into its training programmes and
initiatives following Patten. However, over a number of years, it
failed to do so. 94 In the case of Northern Ireland, the local police
force, made up of a fairly unrepresentative sample of the
population, maintained a high degree of control over the design
and delivery of training.95 In the late 1990s, the RUC embarked
on a programme of massive change at a time when neither the
organisation nor the British government viewed its own past
actions as coming within the category of serious human rights
abuse. Change took place in a context where criticism of the
police had historically been viewed as emanating from
necessarily unpalatable and anti-police agendas.
93 See, e.g., PATTEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 20 The Patten Report recognised that
"[t]raining was one of the keys to instilling a human rights-based approach into both new
recruits and experienced police personnel" and specifically recommended training in the
"fundamental principles and standards of human rights and the practical implications for
policing."
94 See generally id.
95 This was further established in a series of interviews in 2005 with external
trainers contributing to PSNI programmes in which they indicated that they had little
sense of how their individual contributions fitted into the overall police-training context.
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Those managing the process chose to sidestep important
legitimacy questions at the interface of building a human rights
compliant police service on a legacy of past human rights abuses
by police officers. The Northern Ireland experience, thus,
resurfaces a central transitional justice dilemma, which appears
to pit human rights demands for truth and justice against
perceived local peace-building imperatives.
Because training in Northern Ireland tended to be
compartmentalised and divorced to some extent from the broader
imperatives of policing in a post-conflict reality, key issues of
institutional sectarianism, racism, and sexism were insufficiently
tackled in its programmes. For example, while issues around
sectarianism and the legacy of partisan policing are objectively
among the most pressing facing police officers in a post-conflict
setting, time and again training in Northern Ireland has missed
or bypassed these issues altogether. This is evidenced on a
number of levels and can be traced through from the beginning of
the change process to the time of writing.
In 2002, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
found that, far from being facilitated to grapple with the
daunting realities of attempting to police a fraught transitional
space, the first intake of trainees post-Patten had been given
very little in the way of Northern Ireland-specific material with
which to engage. At a critical transitional moment, student
officers were steered away from the very issues (for example,
sectarianism) that would make their policing on the street more
difficult. The inability of training to prepare student officers for
this reality provides evidence of a lack of willingness to confront
deeper issues around the extent of police responsibility for their
own unacceptability in certain geographical areas and within
certain communities.
When reviewed again by the NIHRC in 2004, the PSNI
training approach was still seeking, for a variety of reasons, to
avoid the hard issues that police human rights training must face
if it is to have any real effect. In doing so, it ignored the potential
of the interplay between policing transformation and broader
societal reform, which might be liberated by the honest tackling
of issues on the ground that continue to thwart broad acceptance
of policing arrangements. In Northern Ireland terms, if training
did not impact to challenge the hegemony of the British,
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Unionist, male, securocratic culture within the organisation, the
prognosis for real change in policing, and the reshaping of law
could not be good.
Unhelpful approaches to human rights and diversity can be
justified on the basis that questions of past policing are too
fraught, too raw and too divisive to warrant training engaging
with these issues. However, this unwillingness to venture where
"there be dragons" is also, at a very basic level, about the old
guard holding onto power and unwilling to map its own part in
past wrongdoing onto an explosive transitional space.
The first report commissioned by the Northern Ireland Human
Rights Commission in 2002,96 evaluating the human rights
aspects of the new post-Patten twenty-one week Student Officer
Training Programme (SOTP), found deficiencies in the "content
and contextual basis of the core lessons,"97 which mitigated
against the mainstreaming of human rights. The report made
the point that "[a]lthough fairly frequent reference was made to
human rights during the learning events observed, discussion of
human rights tended to remain at a very superficial level." 98
The report was at pains to point out that:
[S]incere efforts were being made by all of the PSNI
trainers observed to incorporate human rights
elements into ... learning events ... [but] they were
the first to admit that they did not consider
themselves particularly knowledgeable about human
rights issues .... [T]he human rights elements of the
training.., given to PSNI trainers [had] not been
sufficient fully to equip them for the difficult task of
rendering human rights principles meaningful to
student police officers. 99
In this failure to give police trainers the skills necessary to
sufficiently incorporate human rights into the heart of learning
events or to look elsewhere for that expertise, the dangers of
applying a "police" mindset or simply reformulating training
96 NIHRC 2002 REPORT, supra note 80. Among the groups observed was the first-ever
intake (forty-eight students) to graduate as constables of the new PSNI in April 2002.
97 Id. at 22.
98 Id. at 24.
99 Id. at 26. The report also expressed concerns as to lack of communication and
sharing of information and best practice among trainers within the PSNI.
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within traditional parameters and frameworks were thus
concretised.
The NIHRC's follow-up report, published in April 2004,100 and
based on further observation and evaluation of training of both
student officers and probationer constables during 2003,
concluded that trainers had still not been "placed in a position to
respond in an authoritative manner to pertinent questions about
human rights issues which may be raised by probationer
constables."101
I witnessed this myself in the course of conducting a further
evaluation for the NIHRC in respect of the PSNI Course for All,
which was delivered to every member of the organisation, from
Chief Constable to gardener, during 2003. On occasion,
participants displayed sexist, racist, and/or sectarian attitudes.
Generally, tutors did not intervene to explore or challenge such
comments. Instead, far from intervening creatively with such
dynamics, certain tutors themselves occasionally made
inappropriate remarks such as "[r]emember those days when you
had your Michelin calendar and whatever else-then the women
came in-well girlie calendars were out,"102 and "[i]f your super's
on your back and you're a lazy arab, you might get together with
some friends and make a malicious call." 03
Again, there was no sense of a coherent and comprehensive
approach having been adopted in terms of training trainers for
this task. Instead, many trainers, when questioned, did admit to
feeling "pushed off the deep end," with one trainer stating:
"There was no real training for trainers on this course."10 4 So, a
year later, it appears that the powers that be had still not seen
the urgency or significance of revisiting their approach in this
area-in itself indicating the need for a fuller and sharper focus
on the importance of external rather than simply internal police
legitimation.
The NIHRC's 2004 report did find that a number of
improvements had been made,105 and several previous
100 NIHRC 2004 REPORT, supra note 85.
101 Id. at 19.
102 O'RAWE & MCMANUS, supra note 59, at 39.
103 Id. at 50.
104 Id. at 48.
105 See generally id. The improvements include effective usage of problem solving
approaches in many instances.
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recommendations had been taken on board. However, many of
the same issues and key concerns were raised once again, the
bulk of these relating to the appropriateness of the training and
the manner of its delivery.
In practice, a failure to meet the demands of international
human rights law at the moment of transition can taint the
transition with condoning impunity for past wrongdoing or
otherwise devaluing the potential of human rights to impact
radically on policing experience. Allowing human rights training
to take place in the context of ongoing impunity for past
wrongdoing de-legitimates the very messages that human rights
and diversity programmes are trying to send at the very moment
when they most need to be heard in their totality.
II. TRANSFORMING POLICING: DIFFERENT VOICES AND
TRANSITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
Part of having these messages heard in their totality is to
develop and harness human rights and diversity-friendly means
to roll out reform. The answer as to why human rights issues do
not find their way sufficiently into training programmes may
well lie in how training needs are initially conceived and
ultimately developed. This means the focus for training, as for
other change initiatives, must be on process as much as on
outcomes. This section will consider how easily this notion sits
with traditional police thinking, and explore some of the issues
involved in creating transformative processes within a
hierarchical, essentially male, security driven organisation.
A. The Role of Law
If the law has operated unfairly and been seen to belong to and
protect one section of society over another, it is incumbent on
those managing the change process to address this deficit. As
such, reform needs to engage fully with the mistrust that a
previously alienated or disenfranchised section of the population
has traditionally felt in respect of law and policing.
Again, this endeavour is multi-faceted. The role law can play
is to facilitate the development of mechanisms and processes to
involve the hard edges of civil society, either in terms of specific
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equality legislation, the creation of particular accountability
mechanisms and bodies or in providing guiding principles to
shape more closely conditions for a healthy Rule of Law to
flourish. Whether or not consensus can be achieved on what was
wrong with the past, there tends to be a reasonable degree of
agreement that police organisations should be fair,
representative, accountable and respectful of human dignity.
These principles can and should be explicitly enshrined in
policing legislation to be cascaded out throughout the various
manifestations of reform.
Beyond these broad principles, it is rare that societies move to
a position of consensus on what policing means in practice-what
do we want from our police, what would that look like, what
would need to happen in order to make that happen, how would
we know when it has happened? The needs analysis mentioned
in Part I again comes to the fore as something that would be
extremely useful at the beginning of a transition process in order
to secure the views of as many different levels of society as
possible. In encouraging broad ownership of the policing reform
project, law should help ensure that what is eventually created is
actually what is required by that society, broadly understood.
Different spaces need to be created to encourage such thinking.
Law, as well as facilitating others to arrive at a vision of policing
is also an area where vision will need to be developed and where
specific laws and guiding principles will ultimately require
drafting. Law is also one area where there can be a rush to
judgment on what is needed, and what develops there can finish
by reflecting the views of a very narrow band of people. What
appears in legislation is important, not because it will ultimately
happen as intended in practice, but because it very clearly can
add to the creation of a hegemonic or more pluralist view of
policing, depending on the route taken.
In terms of transition, legal responses to policing must be
examined as to the extent they truly reflect the will of the
community. In the first instance, particularly where reform is
contested, and where there is continuity in terms of regime
and/or policing structure, it cannot simply be assumed that legal
or other changes brought in will be either sufficient or
appropriate to the challenge of producing new and broadly
acceptable policing arrangements on the ground. As Mulcahy
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argues, "in the absence of a shared narrative of legitimacy, the
police may turn inwards and focus instead on internally derived
measures. Ultimately though, these measure organisational
activity rather than public acceptance, and it is the latter rather
than the former that is the most significant dimension of the
legitimation process."106
The internal referencing system adopted by police, locally, and
often internationally, generally means that sufficiently inclusive
strategies and processes remain undeveloped, when they, in and
of themselves, might be key to unblocking lines of communication
necessary for trust to develop between police and the policed.
On the ground, it can often happen that legal change or lack of
it, as a subset of the police change process, may serve to
compound organisational belief systems aimed at perpetuating a
state and/or police-centric view of what the conflict was about
and what policing is. This can lead to the maintenance of control
over the process and the privileging of a security driven
government and/or police agenda. Rather than community
realities and experiences, it is instead police imperatives that
will filter into training just as in other areas of the police change
process.
The interests of the state or police management cannot be
conflated with those relating to human rights protection or
community involvement. In ways, these may even be
contradictory aims. This dissonance must be explored and
addressed, with the involvement of disparate and different
communities and voices key to unpacking what is required from
policing in a post-conflict setting. Law should facilitate this in
dynamic and creative ways.
Where tight official control is kept of the police training
agenda,107 the opportunities for linking into different realities
and needs are diminished. Even where some or all responsibility
for policing or police training is in the hands of international
experts or external organisations, 108 a broad analysis of policing
106 MULCAHY, supra note 66, at 196.
107 For example, in certain places, tight control is evidenced by a tendency to bestow
an unwarranted degree of virtuousness on police training being largely developed and
delivered by police.
108 As has happened in Eastern Europe and certain Latin American countries where
the involvement of the Council of Europe, the UN, the FBI and other international or
foreign agencies has been pivotal to the change process.
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or training needs tends not to happen.
Eirin Mobekk makes the case in identifying lessons from UN
peacekeeping missions that "international police forces have been
notoriously poor at consulting civil society on any issue."10 9
Charles Call makes this same point in relation to his work on
policing change in Central America. "National police forces
remain resistant to the introduction of any local participation in
the selection of police officers ... or the influence of outside
voices in the definition of citizen security priorities. All too often
'community policing' is interpreted to mean enlisting the
population in identifying and informing on suspicious activity by
neighbors. While such vigilance can serve some crime prevention
ends, it does not signify the genuine participation of citizens in
the definition and implementation of. . . security policies."" 0
There is a clear need, in terms of the creation of acceptable
policing, for previously alienated sections of the community to be
brought on board and encouraged to have faith in the new
dispensation as being different from the old. This will only
happen where legitimating strategies are inclusive and effective.
The assimilation of discordant voices is a measure of the
effectiveness of law in ensuring new levels of inclusivity and
accessibility. The extent to which a sufficient degree of
inclusivity is achieved may, in turn, point to further deficiencies
or opportunities in law to secure the support of previously
subordinated groupings in society.
Where this does not happen, a failure to render visible
experiences of the conflict which have been unacknowledged by
the dominant male, security-driven, state-centric, paradigm, can
compound and exacerbate the sense of alienation and frustration
felt by those who did not trust the police during the period of
violent conflict. If this happens at the very moment when such
people most need to be brought on board, the entire process,
however well-intended, may be set back.
If the law continues to operate "as normal" in transitional
societies, a suspicious population (or section thereof) is unlikely
109 MOBEKK, supra note 62, at 25.
110 CHARLES T. CALL, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE
CHALLENGES OF VIOLENCE, INJUSTICE AND INSECURITY 60 (Hamburg Institut fur
Iberoamerika-Kunde 2000), available at http://ca202O.fiu.eduIThemes/CharlesCall/
Call.pdf.
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to be convinced that a sufficiently robust framework is in place to
ensure that the history of past abuse will not reoccur. The
human rights framework comes into its own here, but only if it is,
and is seen to be, internalised by those operating the law. This
will require a strong level of partnership with civil society, and
will be evidenced by the process, substance and extent of
engagement with the community in the police and legal change
project. Here again, training provides a key site for assessment
of how partnership approaches are developed and
operationalised.
B. The Legitimating Effects of Human Rights Law
Human rights law is clearly underpinned by principles of
equality and fairness. A key element in the building of
legitimacy is to use these human rights underpinnings to ensure
that policing is accountable to the communities it serves. The
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and a
raft of other international measures concerning the protection of
minorities aim to prevent discrimination."'1 In their broadest
sense, such documents are also concerned with facilitating access
on an equal playing field to the full range of activities and rights
necessary for the full development of the human person.
Policing is one area in which the strength of non-
discrimination and equality principles can be put to the test in
practice. In many societies, policing has traditionally been a
male and fairly homogenous profession in terms of race and class.
These distinctions are felt particularly keenly in conflicted
societies where policing often operates in an arbitrary and
discriminatory way. A test of whether policing has really
changed, post-conflict, is the extent to which police forces are
both more open and accountable to the community at large, and
the extent to which that openness and accountability is reflected
in police training in this area.
111 See generally S.C. Res. 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000); See Laura A.
Donner, Gender Bias in Drafting International Discrimination Conventions: The 1979
Women's Convention Compared with the 1965 Racial Convention, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
241, 241 (1994).
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C. Building for the Future: The Significance of including the
Community
Timely and effective reforms, supplemented by training, can
help anchor the peace only if they change previously
marginalised people's experience of being policed.11 2 By the same
token, any perceived lack of good faith in this area or any hint of
reversion to the past can have an effect in transitional societies
seemingly out of proportion to the act or omission itself. In
Northern Ireland, the Patten Report recommended the
establishment of District Policing Partnerships (DPPs), local fora
that would have access to a budget to be spent on local policing
initiatives, broadly conceived. Twenty-six DPPs were ultimately
set up. However, they were deliberately not allocated the power
to raise funds to spend on their own local initiatives. Patten had
intended these bodies to take democratic participation in policing
to the most local of levels, and to give ordinary citizens a say in
how community safety should be facilitated in their areas. While
depriving these bodies of spending power, the Government
separately established Community Safety Committees, as a
result not of Patten but of a parallel Criminal Justice Review.
The existence of these two sets of bodies attests to the continuing
desire of Government to keep issues compartmentalized and not
to cede too much control to civil society. The Northern Ireland
Office (NIO) retains much more control of the latter process-and
it is here that funds have been made available to spend on
community safety initiatives approved by the powers that be.
Behind the fagade of democratic accountability and inclusivity,
the old guard thus ultimately maintains control of both the
process and the purse strings. A recent assessment of
attendance of the public at DPP meetings has shown no more
than a handful turning up at meetings, while the cost of DPPs
has exceeded £12 million since they were first established in
2003.113 A recent Review of Public Administration now seeks to
112 "Local ownership of the entire process of training and reforming local forces is
essential .... [C]ivil society must be consulted and must feel that they own these
processes that are so crucial for the long-term stability of their country ... [I]f they are
not [consulted] ... the local police ... will not have legitimacy." See MOBEKK, supra note
62, at 24.
113 See Jonathan McCambridge, Policing Farce Goes On, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, June
15, 2006, at 1 (noting that £12 million is representative of a very small part (0.5%) of
overall policing budget allocation and it is certainly possible that DPPs would be much
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reduce the numbers of such bodies. Thus a potentially valuable
opportunity to democratise policing and input into police training
has potentially been squandered.
The transformational imperative, faced with a steep learning
curve, should be to develop appropriate and inclusive tools and
systems and to make real use of the expertise and experience
civil society could bring to the process. Human rights and
diversity training initiatives are among those tools, but must be
used holistically.
Lack of inclusiveness in how training programmes are
conceived, designed and delivered can de-legitimate the policing
change process and any limited results will be simply reformative
of police rather than transformative of policing. Unfortunately,
experience shows that training and other reform ventures rarely
sufficiently countenance the need for a broad re-
conceptualisation and understanding of community endorsement
and acceptability.
This plays out in a number of ways. First, an openness to
sufficiently accommodate or even see broader community
concerns is often lacking in police attempts to grapple with issues
of diversity. Eugene McLaughlin concluded in the wake of the
Stephen Lawrence enquiry114 in England that the police officers
involved "had a woefully inadequate understanding of how racial
discourses were embedded in and constitutive of police work."115
This is particularly the case where there is no societal consensus
on the nature or extent of wrongs suffered at the hands of the
police. The Lawrence enquiry' 16 exposed the Metropolitan police
and, by implication, other forces, to the stark accusation of
"institutional racism."117 While the inquiry continued, many
senior police officers openly refused to accept that police racism
was a real issue in the case and dismissed the label as
unwarranted. When the official verdict of the enquiry confirmed
more effective public accountability fora if they were set up and resourced as
recommended by Patten).
114 The Stephen Lawrence Enquiry considered the racial connotations of the policing
of the investigation into the murder of a black teenager in London. See generally WILLIAM
MACPHERSON, THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE INQUIRY (The Stationery Office 1999).
115 Eugene McLaughlin, The Search for Truth and Justice, CRIM. JUST. MATTERS,
Spring 1999, at 35.
116 See MACPHERSON, supra note 114.
117 See MACPHERSON, supra note 114, at 6.6-6.10 (stating that racism is apparent in
some officers' behavior).
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that "institutional racism" did exist, there were immediate
ramifications for training. These had already been set in motion
when it became clear that this was the direction the tribunal was
heading. A change in the language and emphasis of the training
models delivered to police forces in England and Wales led to the
term "anti-racist" training taking the place of the previously
more comfortable "community race relations."118 The context
contributed to a certain degree of negativity and suspicion
around the training,119 resulting in a backlash against the very
tool aimed at changing behaviour in this area. This is certainly
something that must be guarded against in order to render
training effective. However, the tendency of police to use
comfortable and unchallenging language, particularly in a
transitional society, is even more problematic. In terms of the
past legacy of human rights abuse in Northern Ireland, that
same blindness continues to affect how PSNI officers engage or
fail to engage with the need to move beyond institutional
sectarianism or sexism. In Northern Ireland, initial attempts
dating back to the early 1990s to engage with views of the police
other than the dominant one were styled as a Community
Awareness Programme (CAP) in order to head off controversy. 120
The folly of this was soon clear when officers began referring to
the course as the "Campaign Against Protestants."121 Trying to
deal with racism or sectarianism under the rubric of "community
118 See David Denney, Tom Ellis & Ravinder Barn, Race, Diversity and Criminal
Justice in Canada: A View from the UK, INTERNET J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 2006, at 14-15
(noting that anti-racism term has been "recently reintroduced" and that it took Stephen
Lawrence's murder and The Macpherson Report to notice institutional racism).
119 See Michael Rowe & Jon Garland, Have You Been Diversified Yet? Developments
in Police Community and Race Relations Training in England and Wales, 13 POLICING &
SOCY 399, 404 (Dec. 2003) (citing Marlow & Loveday, After MacPherson: Policing after the
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (RUSSELL HOUSE, LONDON AND ROWE, 2002)); Michael Rowe,
Policing Diversity: Themes and Concerns from the Recent British Experience, POLICE
QUARTERLY, Dec. 2002, Vol. 5, no. 4, 424, 424. Choice of language was also a factor in
terms of ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program)
training, for example, in a number of countries in Latin America where "human dignity"
was felt to be less alienating than "human rights." See also Rachel Neild, Themes and
Debates In Public Security Reform: A Manual for Civil Society-Police Training, WASH.
OFF. LATIN AMERICA (1999).
120 See James Drennan, The Challenges of Leadership in a Divided Society: Policing
in Northern Ireland, THE CAN. REV. POLICING RES. (2005), available at
http://crpr.icaap.org/index.php/crpr/article/viewArticle/34/30 (stating "transition in
thinking had to occur quickly" in Ireland so that police forces could be more "community-
centred and community-driven').
121 See Drennan, supra note 120 (noting that the previously predominantly
Protestant police force was now forced to have equal amounts of Catholic officers).
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relations" belies the reality of the problem. How training is
conceived, named, shaped and delivered in the broad area of
diversity is crucial, and problems will clearly arise if training
allows human rights to be viewed as a "dirty word" or simply
leaves sectarianism, racism, or inherent police sexism off the
agenda. These diversionary techniques simply put off the time in
which underlying issues will need to be engaged. Capacity must
be built among monitoring organisations and projects to take
account of, and not be afraid to, delve into this reality.
The processes by which various groupings in society are
deemed to be stakeholders and partners in the change process
are also worthy of exploration. Often, in transitional societies,
these are considered purely in terms of a narrow view of the
conflict. In Northern Ireland the archetypal groupings, which
must be, in some measure, accommodated by the peace process,
have been deemed to be Catholics and Protestants, officially. For
example, in seeking to redress the balance of an organisation
that was 92% drawn from the Protestant community, Patten's
recommendations resulted in the legal institution of a 50:50
recruiting policy, by which recruiting would consist of half those
selected at each intake being Catholics.122 The reductionist "two
tribes" view taken by Patten in this respect has implications
beyond its ability or otherwise to meet the needs and
expectations of a previously marginalised and excluded group. In
attempting to create "parity of esteem" between these two
groupings, without regard for the needs of a whole range of other
groupings, this policy has the potential to perpetuate
sectarianism, by virtue of its very exclusiveness.
A number of Protestants who would traditionally have been
assured of a job in the police are more likely not to be selected
122 The Patten Report proposed that the 50:50 recruitment policy reflects the
demographic breakdown of people who will reach the age of recruitment during a ten-year
period. See PArTEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 83. There are valid arguments that using the
designations "Catholics" and "Protestants" is problematic in that the conflict in Northern
Ireland was essentially based on political and class views around the constitutional status
of that part of Ireland rather than religious convictions. Increasing the number of
Catholics in the police organisation will not necessarily guarantee that a reasonable
percentage of nationalists or republicans join the ranks. The number of possible
republicans joining will be further reduced by legal strictures on those who have served
prison sentences. An interesting recent phenomenon is that an increasing percentage of
Catholic recruits to the PSNI are actually Polish rather than N. Irish. See Marcus Leroux,
Poles Help Ulster Police to Meet Quota of Catholics, THE TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/newspapers/sunday-timeslbritainarticlel292159.ece.
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under the new system. The fallout from this must be sensitively
addressed. More than this, however, this framing of the post-
conflict scenario in black and white terms factors out of the
equation (or at least puts below the radar screen) a range of other
differences and voices that have equal rights to participation in
policing.
When positing solutions to the conflict, construed and framed
narrowly, other potential stakeholders are bypassed altogether.
These will have also been rendered invisible by the dominant
conflict paradigms to date, both in the explanations of the conflict
and in the solutions put forward for its resolution. These other
discourses might themselves hold the beginnings of very new
understandings of what policing needs to look like and what
community safety is really about.123 Among the constituencies
generally overlooked in conflict-driven policing are women.124
Women also tend to be overlooked in the framing of transitional
solutions. This might be part of the reason why male policing
models tend to be reinserted and revalidated in post-conflict
scenarios.
Fionnuala Ni Aoliin is among a growing group of feminists
pointing out the invisibility and marginalisation of a gendered
experience in peace processes. Because the conduct of
war/conflict is seen in male terms, and because the protagonists
on all sides tend to be largely male, it is essentially males who
negotiate the peace, write the peace agreements and implement
the transitional reforms.125 As such, a male bias and a
123 For instance, Patten failed to engage effectively with the issue of gender in respect
of both its assessment of the problems and its proposals for the future of policing. The loss
to the transitional process of a range of concealed yet key organising principles equally
capable of framing or contributing visibly to the discourse on solutions is further explored
in the Northern Ireland context by Eilish Rooney, Women's Equality in Transition:
Intersectionality in Theory and Place (forthcoming) (paper delivered at Transitional
Justice Institute Seminar Series, University of Ulster, on March 9, 2006).
124 Domestic violence was simply not a policing priority during the period of conflict
in Northern Ireland. Although many women were being seriously injured, and even killed,
in their homes by violent partners, the resources were simply deemed unavailable when
faced with the imperative of policing the "real" conflict. Sixty percent of the women
interviewed for research by McWilliams and McKiernan had experienced violence during
pregnancy and thirteen percent had lost their babies as a result. This marginalisation of
women's experiences and needs is reflected in many other conflicted societies. See
generally MONICA MCWILLIAMS & JOAN MCKIERNAN, BRINGING IT OUT IN THE OPEN:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A STUDY COMMISSIONED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES (N. IRELAND) (1993).
125 See Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, Political Violence and Gender in Times of Transition, 15
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 829, 830 (2006) (stating that "conduct of violence and war is
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disinclination to see the true extent of gendered experiences and
needs can come to dominate the transitional experience. Ni
Aoliin argues, "when violence is understood in specific and
narrow ways, it affects broader understandings of which concerns
become issues for negotiation and mediation purposes."126
Because policing, irrespective of conflict, is still viewed as a
largely male purview, the need to guard against masculinised
views of how to build for the future is doubly important. The
Patten Commission, for all its forward and enlightened thinking,
unwittingly provides further evidence of the "policing as male"
and "transition as male" phenomena in its radical 50:50
recruiting system for Catholics and Protestants. While this was
pushed through in the face of great controversy, very little
creative thinking went into recommendations to change the
problematic, gendered reality of police institutions. Although
there were two women on the Patten Commission, one from a
police background and another from the business sector, their
presence did not impact significantly on gendered
understandings and needs. Gender was simply not "a
meaningful point of reflection or inclusion in [this as in other]
transitional legal and political landscapes."127
The evidence would therefore suggest that the attention paid
to open, inclusive and transparent processes in terms of the
design and delivery of training strategies and events is generally
minimal. The corollary of this must inevitably be that the
perceptible change that such initiatives are intended to inspire
and evidence will also be minimal.
Rather, the internal police sense that certain aspects of police
training require being accomplished in certain ways and that the
police are experts in creating safer societies continues. This is
clearly unsustainable where police have contributed to the
erosion of the fabric of society and the rule of law during the
period of conflict. It is also problematic where international
police personnel are brought in to frame solutions. Meanwhile,
"the underlying social and psychological dimensions of a
conflicted society that have supported the resort to violence, and
the elevation of particular forms of masculinity that accompany
predominantly male, leading to a male bias in negotiations.").
126 See Ni Aoldin, supra note 125, at 831.
127 Ni Aolfin, supra note 125, at 846.
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it, are not in any sense undermined or addressed by a formal
disarmament process,"'128 or by these police framings of problems
and solutions. Basically what is being put in place to cement the
peace can end up being essentially the same failed policing
models with a greater degree of accountability and community
friendly rhetoric attached.129  In transitional contexts
particularly, "the assumption that... improvements in internal
management will eventually increase the capacity of the police to
meet the objectives for which police agencies were created [is
flawed] .... The relationship is not that clear and direct and is
increasingly being questioned."130
A gendered analysis of transitional solutions and resolutions
may substantially contest what is posited as transformative in
the "gender-neutral" transitional moment. "Reflection on
security in a transitional context should make us consider the
extent to which an emphasis on ending or containing political
violence per se constitutes a full and thorough response to the
multitudes of harms that both accompany and survive past the
ending of formal political and military hostilities between
factions."131 Broader conceptions of harms need to be configured
into the debate as to how best to keep people safe from these
harms. Similarly, broader conceptions of how women's
experience can be brought to bear on policing problems needs to
be considered.
In transitional societies we need to expand our
conceptualisation of security and of policing and of how to create
and underpin peaceful societies. This might mean recognising
that the essentially male, force-driven models that have been
created may not be the most effective means of preventing harm
or keeping communities safe. Rather than reform within these
models, transitional spaces should open up an opportunity to
measure what such models have achieved in the past and can
generally be expected to achieve in more or less peaceful
societies, based on the experience of more established and stable
democracies. This conversation might show current models to be
128 Ni Aol~in, supra note 125, at 846.
129 The experience of Croatia and Hungary speaks to this point.
130 Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME
& DELINQ. 236, 237 (1979).
131 Ni Aoliin, supra note 125, at 847.
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ineffective at a range of levels-and the difficulties experienced
in terms of recruiting, retaining and valuing women and ethnic
minorities may be symptomatic of an inbuilt inability of current
models to achieve the core functions police organisations are
ostensibly set up to fulfill.
Very often transitional societies, or at least the "main"
transitional actors, seem to not want to have these conversations.
Instead, much effort is devoted to producing training events that
appear to engage with human rights and diversity issues while
failing fully to do so. To be effective, training must be based
upon: (1) the cultural and gendered realities and sensitivities of a
given society, (2) an initial societal conversation about what
policing should look like, and (3) an organisational and political
awareness of what might stand in the way of achieving that
reality. Without this expansive view of what is required,
important phases in a potentially transformative process can be
overlooked.
Deeper questions as to which community a police force serves
or should serve in a post-conflict reality, how that service can
most appropriately be undertaken and measured, or more
radically, the extent to which a state police model is redundant or
overblown in such societies tend to remain subservient, as I have
argued elsewhere,132 to this managerial and masculinised
framework which has more than its fair share of performance
indicators and boxes to tick-but little room for standing back
and initiating meaningful open-ended dialogue.' 3 3 Thus the
maintenance of police ownership and an essentially male
understanding of the agenda are perpetuated to the detriment of
new thinking and transformative action in respect of policing.
D. The Training Experience in Northern Ireland - A Case Study
in Inclusivity?
The Royal Ulster Constabulary (now PSNI) for many decades
shored up a governmental system that was overtly
132 See Mary O'Rawe, Human Rights and Police Training in Transitional Societies:
Exporting the Lessons of Northern Ireland, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 943, 943-68 (2005) (discussing
human rights training in transforming police practices in transitional societies).
133 See MOBEKK, supra note 62, at 26 (specifying in-depth knowledge of the conflict,
culture, history, laws and community policing as a necessity for international police
training).
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discriminatory against Catholics. Much evidence exists of RUC
involvement, in partisan policing and human rights abuses,
particularly directed against the Catholic/Nationalist community
in Northern Ireland.134 It has always had a breadth of repressive
powers contained in continually renewed "emergency" legislation.
Its agents have been involved and protected in acts of collusion
with paramilitaries up to and including murder. As such, there
has always been a clear organisational subtext that national
security is the ultimate goal, and that the nationalist community
is suspect in its lack of allegiance to the State.
i. Including the Community?: Lessons for Design and Delivery
One of the key themes in this section is the extent to which the
design, delivery and monitoring of new RUC/PSNI training has
been able to move from the security driven, closed, paramilitary
model isolated from the community to a comprehensive and
inclusive partnership framework. Part of the answer will clearly
be influenced by the extent to which police managers continued
to see themselves as the sole and rightful owners of the change
process. One of the realities of a transition phase, so clearly
played out in the Northern Ireland context, is that the
development of an effective and holistic training model cannot be
left to chance, good will or a police view of what is appropriate.
Unless clear strategies are put in place and carefully monitored,
it is inevitable that police will maintain a tight control of
arrangements, and opt for reforming rather than transforming
solutions, often without first truly recognizing or characterizing
the extent of the problems faced. The challenge of creating new
and broadly acceptable policing arrangements requires a holistic
and integrated human rights strategy. The extent of the
challenge is underestimated, undervalued and rendered
ineffectual where first, too much is laid at the door of training
and second where police insufficiently countenance the need to
create and develop effective mechanisms for external
legitimation. That this can happen even where massive
commitment is displayed by police and a huge volume of change
134 For the latest in a long line of publications, see POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 49; see also FINUCANE, supra note 49, which highlights
evidence of collusion between security forces and paramilitary organisations and
recommends public inquiries into four particular murders.
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is undertaken is demonstrated by the Northern Ireland
experience.
During the Course for All in 2003, a session devoted to policing
with the community, while extolling the virtues of PSNI
commitment to policing in partnership, made no attempt to raise
awareness and understanding of the obstacles standing in the
way of partnership. Had a partnership approach been adopted in
the development of a course intended to underscore the
importance of partnership in policing this, in itself, could have
sent valuable signals in terms of how committed management
really was to embedding this concept firmly at the heart of the
organisation. In some respects, such a process might have
proved somewhat unwieldy and posed its own logistical
difficulties-but it would have been a learning process in itself-
and something which could have been of immeasurable benefit to
the organisation, not just in terms of providing a training course,
but in building partnerships and learning to police with the
community at a key stage of the transition process. This
approach simply did not fit with a police view of how things
should be done.
Instead, the police decided for themselves135 both the format
and content of the course choosing what to put in and what to
leave out. Although intended to instruct the full body of
employees as to the new constitutional and policing issues post-
Patten, the assumption was made at an early stage that human
rights were not a central component of this course. 136 Neither
was the issue of sectarianism within the police force itself raised
as a potential issue for inclusion. In failing to address some of
these questions, the Course missed the crucial first stage in
building partnership with the community. From that point, a
very clear message came through in the training sessions I
observed: "If they [that is, the public] don't want [this new
partnership approach]-we go back to old style policing-it's up
to them." There was no recognition as to the importance of
realising that many communities-whether republican, ethnic,
135 Letter from Roy Fleming, Senior Officer, Police Service of Northern Ireland, to the
Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) (Feb. 26, 2003) (on file with author)
("Public views were not sought on the Course for All due to the fact that the contents were
largely prescribed in the Report of the Independent Commission on Policing.").
136 Personal Communication with PSNI Inspector Alan Montgomery, Central
Organiser, Course for All, in Belfast, N.Ireland (Apr. 2003).
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youth, working class etc. would clearly not want to engage with
the police-and that part of policing with the community actually
involves being proactive about working with the marginalisation
and alienation which exists to bring people to a point where
partnership seems like an option not to be totally discounted. It
is easy to exclude, unwittingly or otherwise, those who are not in
a position to mobilise effectively around their interests-or whose
interests appear to threaten the status quo. However, a police
force that fails to engage other than in an enforcement role with
those who are politically marginalised or socially disadvantaged
will reap what it sows in terms of increased alienation and
disaffection at a time when the opposite is required.
To date, in Northern Ireland, despite Patten,137  the
establishment of a Learning Advisory Council, continued
exhortations from the Police Oversight Commissioner138 and the
fact that the PSNI Training, Education and Development
Strategy document has been approved by the civilian Policing
Board,139 there has been no proper needs analysis in terms of
what local communities want and need from policing and what
the police, and other actors, might be in a position to provide.140
Notably this has all occurred at a point when many institutions
in a post-conflict context acknowledge the need to consult with
the communities they serve. Even a managerial indicator such
as reports provided by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary
137 See PATTEN REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.7 (noting that needs analysis is the first
step in formulating new training).
138 Established by the British government on the basis of a further Patten
Recommendation that an eminent overseas person should be appointed for a period of five
years to oversee the implementation of the Patten recommendations. To date, despite
signaling significant PSNI rights compliance with the vast number of Patten
recommendations, it is in the area of human rights training that the Commissioner has
continued to report ongoing concerns. See H. ALAN HUTCHINSON, REPORT OF OVERSIGHT
COMMISSIONER (2006), available at http://www.oversightcommissioner.org/reports/pdfs/
june2006.pdf.
139 This body has statutory responsibility under the Police (NI) Act 2000 for ensuring
the effectiveness and efficiency of the force. It has recently published an externally
commissioned strategy document relating to auditing compliance of the PSNI with the
European Convention of Human Rights, as incorporated by the UK-wide Human Rights
Act 1998. See KEIR STARMER & JANE GORDON, N. IR. POLICING BOARD, MONITORING PSNI
COMPLIANCE WITH THE HUMAN RIGHT'S ACT 1998 UNDER THE STATUTORY DUTY IN
S.3(3)(B)(II) OF THE POLICE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 2000 (2003), available at
http://www.nipolicingboard.org.uk/hr.pdf. According to this document, its reach into the
realm of training will not extend very far.
140 Bearing Point Consultants did conduct a form of Training Needs Analysis for the
PSNI in 2004, but a number of relevant issues were not sufficiently considered.
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(HMIC)141 has attested to the need to "establish[] ongoing (equal)
partnerships with communities" and the fact that PSNI systems
and processes were unlikely to properly take society's needs into
account. 142
The Course for All showed how difficult it is for a police
organisation in a jurisdiction like Northern Ireland to really take
this message on board, despite having signed up for it in theory.
It took others outside the policing family to point out the
shortcomings below the surface and look for ways to address the
problems identified.
That the pattern is continuing is evidenced by a workbook
accompanying a new flagship diversity programme recently
delivered to PSNI and Garda personnel in the Border counties of
Ireland. The workbook has been produced to a high specification.
It is glossy, user-friendly and features a CD-ROM. However, it
includes minimal reference to sectarianism-what it does say is
clearly in passing and buried among a host of other issues. The
treatment accorded indicates a clear attempt to limit the focus on
this issue to something of marginal concern.
ii. The PSNI Learning Advisory Council - Lessons in
Partnership
A Learning Advisory Council (LAC) was set up by the PSNI in
2003 to attempt to respond to deficits that had been pointed out
in respect of taking community views on board in the training
arena. For the first time, decisions about police training claimed
to be made in partnership with the community, signifying an
important departure from past ways of doing things. In theory,
this sixty-strong body was to provide a pivotal interface with
various strata of the community in Northern Ireland and to
141 See, e.g., HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, INSPECTORATE
REPORT, TRAINING MATTERS (2002), http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/
inspecLreportsl/ptdlthematic/training-matters/tmreport.pd?view=Binary [hereinafter
TRAINING MATTERS]; HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, INSPECTORATE
REPORT, DIVERSITY MATTERS (2003), http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/
inspect reportsl/ptdlthematic/diversity-matters/dmreport.pdfview=Binary [hereinafter
DIVERSITY MATTERS]; see also HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY,
INSPECTORATE REPORT, BEST VALUE REVIEW OF POLICE TRAINING 15, 1 10 (2005),
http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspectreports 1/ptd/bvr-ptd/
bvrtpsni05.pdf?view=Binary [hereinafter BEST VALUE REVIEW] (concluding the Service
still needed to develop a robust strategy for effectively engaging communities in all
aspects of the training cycle).
142 DIVERSITY MATTERS, supra note 141, at 19.
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provide the means for societal engagement with the PSNI
training project. However, the inclusiveness of this body was
tempered by the fact that participation was by invitation of the
police, and, the space, although nominally there,143 was not
properly created for grassroots community involvement either in
the body itself or in its agenda. Part of the Council's mandate
was to ensure that training took account of community needs.144
However, none of the community representatives actually under
contract to provide training inputs to the PSNI were to have
either a place or voting rights on the Council itself.145
The Terms of Reference for the Learning Advisory Council
were drawn up within the PSNI and framed in the clinical,
conflict-divorced language of providing "an independent
perspective.., linked to the continuous improvement and
business planning process within Training Education and
Development (TED)."
By and large, issues were dealt in managerial terms with
minutes of the Council's meetings as significant for what was not
discussed at meetings as for what was. This proves that the
setting up of an oversight body can never be viewed as itself an
indication that oversight or partnership has, in fact, been
achieved.
The role and function of the Learning Advisory Council (now
Police Learning Advisory Council) was subsequently reviewed by
a management consultancy firm in 2005.146 This report, although
it failed to situate the Council in the context of what might be
required in a post-conflict setting, made a number of important
points. Almost half of the members reported that they
understood neither the role of the LAC nor their role on it, with a
"significant minority" viewing the PSNI training and
143 In the original terms of reference accepted at the LAC meeting of September 12,
2003, business and learning professionals and community representatives were to have
equal numbers on the Council. However, there were clearly communities that PSNI would
not have any reach into, and the fact that expenses to facilitate attendance would not be
provided demonstrated a lack of insight into the arrangements that might need to be put
in place to ensure meaningful participation by many working at community level.
144 See PATTEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.2.
145 See PSNI TED LAC Terms of Reference and Operating Protocol, Version 0.4 (June
25, 2003), reprinted in POLICE SERVICE OF N. IRELAND, LEARNING ADVISORY COUNCIL
EVALUATION REPORT 11, T. 3.1 (Deloitte MCS Ltd, Belfast 2005) [hereinafter LAC
REPORT].
146 Id. at 11.
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development section as having "undue influence." 147 While many
felt the body was having a positive impact on training, education
and development, again "significant minorities felt it was having
no impact, whilst another body of members said they did not
know what impact it was having." 148 One recommendation of the
review was that the "connection between what the LAC is trying
to do and how it contributes to wider policing objectives needs to
be revisited, discussed, understood" with a clear need to
"establish processes that provide more meaningful engagement
than at present."149 The report pointed specifically to the need to
engage loyalist, republican and ethnic minority voices, something
that one might have expected to be factored into the process from
day one, but clearly indicative of a continuing shying away from
hard issues.
The PSNI, like many other police organisations, is clearly
speaking the language of consultation and partnership, without
seeming to understand the implications of actually following this
through, or the consequences for the organisation's standing
among alienated communities if seen to say one thing and do
another. The assumption that the police already know what is
deliverable and how best it might be delivered relegates
consultation and partnership to two levels--one an exercise of
form in which the public is viewed by the police as requiring to be
educated or informed, and the second an exercise in smoke and
mirrors where selected conversations take place with those
chosen by the police themselves as appropriate and suitable
consultees/partners.150 Transitional processes require more than
this if law and policing are to be legitimated in reality.
147 Id. at 4.
148 Id.,
149 Id. at 6.
150 For example, the police have continued to maintain strong links with traditional
partners, including particular individuals at the University of Ulster with whom they
have worked over several decades. Mediation Northern Ireland is the only locally based
NGO to have had any kind of real input into training, but much of its work is not in the
public domain and much of it no longer continues.
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iii. Peace 11151 Diversity Programme - Lessons in Consultation
The process by which the PSNI's most recent diversity training
venture has come about is also instructive here. The project was
much vaunted as linking into community needs in holding an
initial three-day focus group152 session to which a range of
community activists, as well as certain members of the PSNI and
An Garda Sioch~na (the Police Service for the rest of Ireland)
were invited. Though participants came from a range of groups
and organisations and reflected a wide range of special interests,
there were certain voices not present or represented. The most
notable of these gaps was that no one from a republican or
loyalist background had been invited to raise the difficult and
challenging areas of both social class and sectarianism as bars to
effective policing. On top of this, the fact of trying to create a
"one size fits all" diversity programme to adequately meet the
needs of two separate police forces, coming from different
histories and traditions was going to be inherently problematic.
The PSNI notion that sectarianism could receive marginal
attention in a broader diversity framework, or that the issues
could be meaningfully developed in a class where half the
participants had no experience of what it had meant to be an
RUC officer during the conflict or the legacy left for PSNI officers
currently, very much belied the reality on the ground. The fact
that those who would most meaningfully raise such issues at the
early stages of this process were not even invited to do so again
showed scant regard for the need to really bring communities on
board or to listen to disparate and dissonant needs. Instead what
went on to happen in the course of this three day process serves
to provide an example of different agendas and needs being co-
opted into the dominant paradigm rather than being factored
into the discourse in their own right.
At a point over the three days, community invitees began to
151 See Department of Finance and Personnel, Peace II Funding,
http://www.dfpni.gov.uklindex/finance/european-funding/eu-peace-2.htm. (last visited Feb.
28, 2007). The EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (2000-2006) was intended to
address economic and social issues in the specific context of Northern Ireland's transition
to a more peaceful and stable society. The spending of such money on such a project is
itself open to debate.
152 The three-day session was facilitated by an independent organisation. Dubbed
"Future Search," this process was intended to give a stamp of validity to the process and
involve key stakeholders from the beginning in the design of this training development
initiative.
[Vol. 22:1
2007] HUMANRIGH7S, TRANS1TIONAL SOCIETIESAND POLICE TRAIN1NG 253
articulate a range of issues not specifically on the police agenda.
They mentioned the "elephants in the room" that were being
shied away from. They also pointed to a huge range of training
materials and programmes already developed in respect of
diversity training and began to ask whether the focus, rather
than developing another training programme, might better be on
the real factors at a systemic and organisational level that might
actually thwart the diversity agenda going forward. The main
session in which this happened was a very powerful one with a
clear consensus from community representatives that the
development of a new training programme was not what was
needed at this point. Undaunted, the police continued to develop
the programme in line with their original intentions.
This example illustrates why mainstreaming human rights
and diversity cannot be allowed to remain the domain of a police
organisation or international police actors who continue a policy
of splendid isolation while surrounding themselves with
"partners" considered acceptable in the process. 153
iv. The Importance of the Right Type of Oversight
The PSNI is very quick to point out that it is the most
scrutinised police force in the world. By extension, the
organisation makes the case that it is therefore the most
accountable. This is not necessarily so. The complete
effectiveness of new oversight or partnership initiatives
established in a transitional context is something which cannot
be taken as a given. They need to be capable of and facilitated to
ask the right questions and get the necessary answers in terms of
ensuring that increased scrutiny actually results in increased
accountability.
In Northern Ireland, without the independent evidence
provided by hands on monitoring initiatives such as those
commissioned by the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission, there would be little to dispel the notion that all
153 McLaughlin and Murji describe this phenomenon of pulling "the debate back
within the organisation" as "a classic police move." Where this is permitted to happen,
"[c]onsultation and change will happen.., on terms laid down by the force." See J.
Eugene McLaughlin and Karim Murji, After the Stephen Lawrence Report, 19 CRITICAL
SOC. POL'Y 371, 379 (August 1999).
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was fine in respect of police training.154 Independent oversight of
the human rights elements of a police training programme can,
therefore, provide a useful and often undervalued litmus test in
terms of organisational commitment to real, effective and lasting
change. Where such oversight engages with confronting and
exploring the tensions between organisational and societal
imperatives that may jeopardise the change process, it can point
to areas where extensive rethinking and capacity building may
be required.
Independent oversightl55 can serve to bring a level of insight
and transparency beyond the police view of what is happening.
However, its real merit lies in the extent to which its focus is on
the difficult transitional realities and in developing
understanding by looking behind and beyond the dictates of
managerialism, modernisation and cost-effectiveness, as
narrowly understood. Even where oversight succeeds in pointing
up possible ways forward, it must also have some possibility of
ensuring that the implementation of these is effective and
process-centred. In Northern Ireland, this would be the purview
of the Policing Board established in November 2001156 as a
statutory body with a duty to ensure police effectiveness and
efficiency.157 In terms of training, the Policing Board did very
little prior to the appointment of a human rights consultant in
February 2003. It is entirely possible that without the insights
garnered by the Human Rights Commission, the schema for
154 Human rights "auditing" carried out by the PSNI, in terms of monitoring the
integration of human rights into Student Officer learning events, was exposed by the
NIHRC as essentially a paper exercise of form rather than substance, with those charged
with the internal auditing function having received no specific training in this regard.
155 For example, oversight carried out by experts outside the police or broader
governmental framework, who have a grounded knowledge of human rights and human
rights education in a policing context, an awareness of the organisation and its past, a
sensitivity to the jurisdictional context in which they are working and an understanding
of transition and management of change issues.
156 The process by which the body came into existence, the length of time it took to
set up, the composition of the Board, its systems, workings and priorities all have their
own story to tell. There is not scope in this article to begin to engage with this. For a
detailed discussion, see COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE
NORTHERN IRELAND POLICING BOARD (2003), http://www.caj.org.uk/Commentary%20
by%20CAJ%20on%20the%20Northern%2OIreland%20Policing%2OBoard%20pdf.pdf.
157 By virtue of the Police (NI) Act 2000, the Board is under a duty to ensure that the
police are efficient and effective. POLICE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 2000 (2000), ch. 32, §
3(2). In carrying out this function, the Board is under a further duty to monitor the
performance of the police in complying with the Human Rights Act 1998. Id., at §
3(3)(b)(ii). In doing so it should have regard to the need to co-ordinate its activities with
those of other statutory authorities and co-operate with such authorities. Id., at § 3(4)(d).
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monitoring police compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998
would still not be in place.158 Since then, further human rights
consultants have been commissioned by the PSNI specifically to
audit the human rights aspects of their training and an in-house
human rights lawyer was recruited in 2006 to advise solely in
respect of training.
Although these moves might be welcome, they come faced with
clear evidence of an organisation's failure to appreciate the
degree to which human rights training poses real challenges to
the way things have been done in the past and the need to
effectively measure progress in this regard. It would seem that
compliance with administrative rather than substantive goals
has ultimately been viewed as the benchmark, when police are
left to conduct such exercises themselves. Recent moves by the
Policing Board159 and PSNI may well help alleviate matters in
this regard and signal the beginning of the paradigm shift
necessary to mainstream human rights concerns-but the fact
remains that unnecessary ground has already been lost in this
endeavour and it will be difficult to make this up where cynicism
of the wider disaffected populace has already begun to set in.
It could be argued, particularly given the Oversight
Commissioner's decision in its most recent report to sign off on
all other aspects of Patten apart from training, that it took "other
eyes" apart from those coming from a "police" background or
framework to see beyond the formal appearance of change.
Where oversight focuses on administrative compliance or an
internal police sense of what is right, this may disguise a deep-
rooted (and perhaps subconscious) inertia or structural inability
to engage with the degree of change necessary to meet the
158 The plan is for the Policing Board to "evaluate all the training material used for
PSNI human rights training... [and] the effectiveness of the protocol for auditing and
reviewing human rights training.., from February 2003 onwards." In respect of what
has gone before, the plan is for the Board to "draw on the previous research already
conducted by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the PSNI as
important background material of relevance to current training." The Policing Board will
consider the PSNI's own arrangements for monitoring the actual delivery of human rights
training and keep itself informed of the work of the Advisory Council on Training. KEIR
STARMER & JANE GORDON, N. IR. POLICING BOARD, MONITORING PSNI COMPLIANCE WITH
THE HUMAN RIGHT'S ACT 1998 UNDER THE STATUTORY DUTY IN S.3(3)(B)(II) OF THE POLICE
(NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 2000, 4 (2003), available at http://www.nipolicingboard.org.ukl
hr.pdf; see supra text accompanying note 139.
159 For further discussion of the framework of indicators for monitoring human rights
compliance from 2004 onwards set out by the PSNI, see id.
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human rights challenges faced by a society seeking to leave its
troubled past behind.
Stringent criticism is still viewed as emanating from an anti-
police agenda. This in itself is made possible by the dishonesty of
an official discourse that fails to acknowledge the part of the past
in shaping the present and dictating the future. It appears that
certain bodies are deemed "acceptable" to deliver certain types of
criticism in certain contexts. Anything that goes beyond this
purview is something to be either ignored or vilified as damaging
to police morale or destabilising of the peace process itself.
However, it is precisely the hard-to-stomach critique which may
contain the seeds of a more fruitful attempt to effect
transformation. Thus, the wheel turns full circle-to be truly
effective, changes in police training (and in other key
organisational aspects) cannot be built on foundations that do not
countenance the role the police have historically played in the
conflict.
Beyond this, the more basic conclusion remains-training on
its own, no matter how stratified, monitored, in tune with
community needs and able to engage with difficult issues can
actually amount to an appropriate vehicle for the delivery of
institutional transformation. Many of the issues raised by this
paper have as much to do with systems, structures and belief
systems which require to be challenged and changed in and of
themselves in order to be consistent with the messages sought to
be delivered by effective human rights training. It is to drawing
some of these issues together that the conclusion now turns.
CONCLUSION
Effective police change processes require the coherent and
thought-through translation of well-conceived notions of
legitimacy and inclusivity into transitional imperatives and
reforms. If these difficult concepts do not sufficiently shape and
guide the process by which police training and other reform
efforts are developed, policing reform may well be insufficient to
garner the necessary respect for a supposedly chastened and
rehabilitated Rule of Law in a society where the legacy of conflict
will still be playing out.
As I have argued elsewhere, in many ways, the dilemmas
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posed by training mirror and upfront some of the very issues that
prevent broader societal peace-building from gaining ground.160
They also help unpack something of the process of legitimation of
policing and of law and why it can be so difficult in transitional
societies. It would appear that key legitimating strategies such
as human rights and inclusivity are not being used to best effect
in policing reform processes around the world.
Chan makes the point that "radical change, though politically
risky and unpopular, can be more successful in transforming
organisational directions than incremental change, which
requires a long period of sustained organisational and political
commitment to produce effects."161 In transitional societies, there
is clearly a window of opportunity to take such transformative
and radical measures. However, when stripped down, many
measures, claiming to be innovative and transformative, can
prove merely to have painted old ways of doing things with a
human rights and diversity gloss.
Where this is allowed to happen, the legacy of conflict coupled
with the insertion of inappropriate or insufficient change
mechanisms into a fragile transitional space, may serve a
number of agendas but will, ultimately not ensure faith in and
respect for the Rule of Law.
Rather than pumping money into police human rights and
diversity training, resources should be used to create capacity for
societal thinking about what it means to succeed in changing the
experience of policing in traumatised societies and how that
might be achieved. A "lessons learned" approach should be
adopted to the development of new partnerships and processes
which will create space to include more than "traditional" actors
and stakeholders and capacity to think beyond traditional
responses. Reconceptualisations of policing, legitimacy and the
public good might then be intimately stitched into the change
process in a way that has not happened in transitional
police/security sector reform processes to date.
Training and oversight of that training are important to the
extent that they are attuned to the concrete difficulties of making
human rights and diversity "fit" within traditional models of
160 See O'Rawe, supra note 132, at 943-68
161 JANET B. CHAN, CHANGING POLICE CULTURE 1 (Cambridge University Press
1997).
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policing. We have already seen that the "fit" is difficult. In
transitional contexts, the specific legacies of conflict and the
cultural landscape into which change is ushered, must also be
factored into the equation, so that change is able to engage
coherently and inclusively with previously alienated or devalued
communities. This review of training initiatives has helped
expose the extent to which potentially key framing narratives are
being rendered invisible by both discourse around the conflict
and the process of change. This makes the need all the more
evident for an initial, more inclusive societal conversation in
terms of what policing is about, what policing change might
actually mean in practice, how to craft a holistic strategy and
process and how to measure the effectiveness of change in more
than "male" or "police" ways.
If these processes were subjected to meaningful evaluation162
and review, training and, more significantly education in its
broadest sense, could form a potentially important part of the
transformation jigsaw-one which may well show that real
transformation lies beyond what state policing is able to deliver.
All of this necessitates exploration of whether, if human rights
cannot be made to fit into the extant organisational paradigm, it
is not just new training or management tools which are
necessary but a very different conceptual framing of what
policing means and should mean in a post-conflict setting. The
paradox is that precisely when a society has been so conflicted,
and when it is so difficult and sensitive to move forward, there
opens for a short time a window of opportunity to reframe the
debates, render concealed narratives visible and effect a
transformation in thinking which has implications far beyond
institutional reform.
Whether, as Shearing and Bayley suggest,163 we are at the
dawn of a new policing era where the State no longer holds sway,
or whether Jones and Newburn164 are correct to see continuity in
discontinuity, or even if what we are witnessing globally is
simply policing moving back into historical spaces and paradigms
162 See THE CHALLENGES PROJECT, supra note 54, at 127 (noting that at an
international level, it is this area of evaluation of the utility and validity of international
training or other interventions which is most frequently ignored).
163 See Bayley & Shearing, supra note 2, at 585.
164 See Jones & Newburn, supra note 2, 133-34.
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as Zedner 165 posits-transitional societies and processes are
ideally placed to provide useful seed beds for very different
conceptions of policing, law and State. However, these need to be
envisioned and practically constructed in legitimate and inclusive
ways if they are to be the harbinger for more legitimate and
inclusive realities in power-based societal relationships.
165 See Zedner, supra note 2, at 78-79.

